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Introduction
Women who "cry rape" are not believed. Even women who es-
chew the cry and calmly report sexual violence are not believed (be-
cause they don't behave like real victims). Women are disbelieved
because they delay reporting rape. Those who report promptly are
suspected of malice or delusion. Attempts to address problems of
rape through changes in evidence law and substantive criminal law
have met with questionable success.1 Many have bemoaned the inef-
fectiveness of legal measures, arguing that social attitudes must
change before any significant improvement in the treatment of rape
victims occurs.2
I reject the notion that disbelief of women is entirely a problem
of social attitude which is intractable to legal reform. Although social
attitudes influence the decision to report, investigate, prosecute and
believe rape, even the procedural law of evidence, affects how rape
influences the general tenor of social belief. The relationship be-
tween law and social beliefs is dynamic; courtrooms shape, as well as
mirror, cultural truths.
In this article I analyze how various uses of character evidence in
rape trials can help address this problem. My proposals, informed by
feminist principles, strive to counteract jurors' stereotypes and to
1. The affirmatively misogynist requirements of substantive rape law-that the vic-
tim must resist her attacker and that her testimony must be corroborated by other evi-
dence-is no longer required. Additionally, evidence law has eliminated the cautionary
instruction warning the jury about the danger of false rape accusations which are, accord-
ing to the instruction, easily made and difficult to disprove.
2. See, e.g., David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System.
87 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1228 (1997).
3. Obviously no consensus exists on the definition of feminism and my brief discus-
sion is necessarily tendentious and incomplete. I identify three major goals of feminism:
(1) Tangibly improving the lives of women including, most importantly, eliminating sub-
ordination of women, (2) Deriving knowledge and power from the experiences of women;
(3) Providing empathy and support for all oppressed people. These aims transcend the
limited goals of strict, formal parity and include the subtle ways in which law, as well as
informal social and cultural arrangements, may discriminate against women. For a more
detailed explanation of my feminist philosophy, see Aviva Orenstein, "MY GOD!": A
Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL. L. REV.
159 (1997) (using a feminist method to criticize and propose reforms of the excited utter-
ance doctrine, a codified exception to the hearsay rule); Aviva Orenstein, Get off the Blue
Bus: Incorporating a Feminist Analysis into Evidence Policy Where You'd Least Expect It,
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educate jurors and society at large, about rape.4
It is undeniable that trials, particularly notorious ones, serve a
pedagogical function in modem America. Trials serve as cultural fa-
bles, sparking debate and relaying their own object lessons. These
stories have exploded into popular culture, and their audience is any-
one who watches television. Part melodrama, part morality play, and,
for the layperson, part inscrutable lawyer talk, recent rape trials have
introduced serious questions into public discourse about the legal
process, rape law, and perhaps most importantly for our focus here,
how and when we know things to be true.
In this article, I examine current approaches to evidence law in
rape trials, and I speculate about how rape trials can perform their
educational function in ways that are fair to the accused and the vic-
tim.6 I briefly present the current rules of character evidence in Sec-
And Advocating an Exception for Apologies, SW. U. L. REV. - (forthcoming 1998).
4. It should come as no surprise that feminism, which is deeply concerned with how
women are heard, should have much to say about evidence law, particularly in the area of
rape. Evidence law is an ideal candidate for feminist analysis because both evidence and
feminism are concerned with questions of relevance, communication, and credibility. Re-
cently, feminist scholarship has begun to examine evidence. See, e.g., Kit Kinports, Evi-
dence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 413, 430-452 (offering insights into how the evi-
dence rules may ignore the experiences of women and instead reflect male values and
norms); Kathy Mack, Continuing Barriers to Women's Credibility: A Feminist Perspective
on the Proof Process, 4 CRIM. L.F. 327 (1993) (drawing on psychological research that the
gender task force reports to discuss women's problems in gaining respect and credibility in
the courtroom); Rosemary Hunter, Gender in Evidence: Masculine Norms vs. Feminist Re-
form, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 127, 127, 155-62, 166 (1996) (exploring questions of credi-
bility and relevance and arguing that women's stories must first be allowed into court, and
"then they must be taken seriously"); Kim Lane Scheppele, Just The Facts Ma'am: Sexu-
alized Violence, Evidentiary Habits, and the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 123,
123 (1992) (examining why the "stories women tell in court, particularly in cases of sexu-
alized violence like rape, are vulnerable to attack as unbelievable.").
5. Thus, in determining the "truth" of a rape case, we must recognize it not only in a
narrow case-specific adjudicatory sense, but also as it influences the larger cultural debate.
In searching for truth, it is useful to acknowledge that honesty is not among our best quali-
ties as students and purveyors of courtroom procedure. Evidence scholars operate in a
world of denial about what juries can and will do. For example, in applying Rule 609, we
instruct juries to consider felonies for the purpose of impeachment only, and not criminal
propensity, even though we know such mental gymnastics are unachievable.
6. I use the terms "victim," "survivor," and "complaining witness" interchangeably,
aware of the deficits of each. The nomenclature reflects the core dilemma of rape. Before
conviction, we must presume the accused to be innocent. Yet, by referring to the woman
as the "alleged victim" or "alleged survivor," we trigger a special form of deep mistrust
that seems reserved for women who report rape (as opposed to other crimes). "Com-
plaining witness" seems to trivialize rape. The term "victim" connotes helplessness. See
Martha R. Mahoney, Exit: Power and the Idea of Leaving in Love, Work and the Confir-
mation Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283, 1311 n.115 (1992) (explaining that "survivor"
has replaced "victim" in feminist vocabulary to refute the notion that the woman in rape
and battering situations is passive). "Victim," however, also has the benefit of reinforcing
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tion II. Next, in Section III, I analyze the special challenges of rape
trials, positing that rape trials depend on and perpetuate a paradig-
matic tale of rape, involving an attractive, modestly dressed victim
who is brutally beaten and sexually attacked by a deviant sociopath
with whom she has no prior relationship. Deviation from the para-
digm, such as when the woman is dressed provocatively or is on a date
with the perpetrator, often leads to disbelief of the woman. This cul-
tural fable affects the course of rape trials because it drowns out the
voices of victims who do not fit the paradigm.7 I will punctuate the
discussion with examples from the recent Alex Kelly rape trials to il-
lustrate and humanize these special problems.8 The Alex Kelly case
blamelessness. Cf Kate E. Bloch, A Rape Law Pedagogy, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 307,
308 n.6 (1995) (using "the term rape 'survivor' reluctantly" because of respect for the
feelings of victimization of people who have been raped).
7. As Mary Coombs has observed, "The range of 'credible' stories is narrower than
the range of true ones." Mary I. Coombs, Telling the Victim's Story, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN &
THE L. 277, 280 (1993).
8. In 1987, at age 19, Alex Kelly fled to Europe after having been accused of two
rapes in the same week. Both women reported that he raped them in his car on the way
home from a party, threatening further harm if they reported him. Two additional women
have come forward to report that as teenaged girls they were raped by Kelly. See Lynne
Tuohy, Prosecutors Have More Rape Claims; If Kelly Took Stand, 3 Others Reportedly
Were Ready to Testify, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 15, 1996, at Al. Although Kelly
denied the allegations and claimed that the women consented, he nevertheless skipped
bail. Upon his return ten years later, Kelly was tried for the rape of Adrienne Bak Orto-
lano, who was 17 at the time of the rape. Ms. Ortolano came forward to discuss her expe-
riences. See Monte Williams, Victim of Rape Goes Public After 11 Years of Nightmares,
N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1997, at Al. Ms. Ortolano had physical evidence of choking and
vaginal bruising. The opinion of the doctor who examined Ms. Ortolano was that she had
been "viciously raped." See Rafael A. Olmeda, Doc Recalls '86 Rape Case Says She 'Will
Never Forget' Girl's Bruises, DAILY NEWS, Oct. 23, 1996, at 7. Nevertheless, the trial
ended in a hung jury and the judge declared a mistrial. The jury was concerned about
some discrepancies in Ms. Ortolano's story concerning how Mr. Kelly could have simulta-
neously choked her and lowered the seat in the car. See Turning Point (ABC television
broadcast, Dec. 5, 1996) (transcript # 168-1) [hereinafter Turning Point]. The jury did not
learn about Kelly's other rape charge. However, a second jury, which also did not learn
about any other rape accusations against Mr. Kelly, convicted him of raping Ms. Ortolano.
As of this writing, Kelly will soon stand trial for the second rape charge and for various
breaches of the peace which arose when he was on bail. Because of his "ski bum" status
when he was on the run, Kelly was derided in the press as a spoiled rich kid. The Daily
News referred to him as the "preppie rape suspect Alex Kelly," though he attended public
school. Rafael A. Olmeda & Wendell Jamieson, Victim's Sis Reveals Rape Suspect Threat,
DAILY NEWS, Oct. 19, 1996 at 8; see also David Stout, Former Fugitive Is Facing New
Troubles, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1996, at B5. Mr. Kelly's story will soon be a CBS movie
made for television. See Entertainment Briefs BPI Entertainment News Wire (Aug. 11.
1997). It is fitting that his story serve as the anecdotal counterpart to the psychological.
social, and legal evidence discussed in this article. As Thomas Puccio, Mr. Kelly's attor-
ney, complained, Kelly "has become the poster boy for everyone who wants to say some-
thing about the crime of rape." Lynne Tuohy, Kelly Gets 16 Years, THE HARTFORD
COURANT, July 25, 1997, at Al.
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is particularly apposite because it involved character questions con-
cerning the other accusations against Kelly. It is also a good source
for illustration because, in the words of the attorney for the rape sur-
vivor, Alex Kelly's defense "pandered to every stereotype we have
ever heard about rape victims."
9
Section IV questions how we can craft character evidence rules
to counteract the cultural pull of the rape fable in ways that are both
fair to individual defendants and respectful of feminist principles. I
evaluate four potential character-based solutions to the problem of
proving rape: (1) Rape shield, which limits certain types of character
evidence about the victim; (2) Rule 413, and to a lesser extent Rule
404(b) and the doctrine of chances, all of which, albeit under different
theories, admit evidence concerning prior wrongful acts by the ac-
cused; (3) Trial techniques that affirmatively use jurors' stereotypical
thinking about rape to fit the case within a familiar story of rape and
thereby convince the jury to convict; and (4) Expert testimony that
admits additional background, providing the jury with relevant in-
formation about rape victims, perpetrators, and the crime itself to
contravene popular stereotypes.
I argue that the twin goals of listening to women and protecting
the rights of defendants can be accomplished by undermining the
rape paradigm and educating the jury about rape. I applaud eviden-
tiary rules such as rape shield that prevent juries from learning infor-
mation that reinforces the cultural paradigm. To further subvert the
paradigm, I suggest expert testimony should be expanded to allow
experts to educate the jury about the incidence and nature of rape,
including demographics and social science.
However, not all the currently proposed character-based solu-
tions for gaining increased rape convictions are moral, feminist, or
even good for women in the long run. I reject the new Rule 413 and
other attempts to admit evidence of prior bad acts by the accused,
which rest on anti-feminist principles and stereotypes about rapists.
Similarly, I oppose trial tactics that rely on rape myths and persuade
the jury to convict by matching the facts of the case to a cultural
paradigm. Evidentiary mechanisms that reinforce cultural paradigms
or somehow capitalize on them because the survivor just happens to
fit the stereotype of the "innocent" victim, are undesirable and ulti-
mately counterproductive from a feminist perspective. We must re-
ject strategies for rape trials that are grounded in our culture's fondly
held but demonstrably wrong fables of rape, even if resorting to the
paradigm would, in the short term, achieve the laudable goal of con-
viction.
9. See William Glaberson, Judge Declares A Mistrial in Rape Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 13,1996, at BI (quoting David S. Golub, Ms. Ortolano's attorney).
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I. The Current State of Character Evidence
A. Doctrine
The traditional rule prohibits circumstantial use of character evi-
dence, known as "propensity" evidence, whereby evidence of a per-
son's particular characteristic or trait is offered to argue that the per-
son acted in conformity with that trait or characteristic. For example,
the prosecution cannot use evidence that the accused has a violent
temper to argue that she probably started the fight in question.
Similarly, evidence that the accused once started a fight on another
occasion would also be inadmissible.
With the exception of questioning the character of witnesses for
honesty, the rule against using character evidence to prove behavior
on a particular occasion is absolute in civil cases.' In criminal cases,
however, certain exceptions have arisen where the accused may
choose to raise the issue of his own good character or the bad charac-
ter of the victim (and the prosecutor may rebut the same)."
Although not an exception to character evidence, Rule 404(b) is
intimately related to the ban on propensity evidence. Rule 404(b), in
addition to reiterating the ban on character evidence to prove pro-
pensity, also clarifies that specific acts (that may have some propen-
sity overtones) can be admitted for other legitimate purposes. Rule
404(b) provides examples of specific act evidence, such as proving
motive or plan, which are admissible because they are not being used
to prove propensity, or generalized character, but rather are inde-
pendently relevant for another legitimate purpose.' 2  For our pur-
10. Exceptions to the propensity rule exist for impeaching witnesses. In questioning
witnesses or challenging their credibility generally, evidence may be adduced that focuses
on the character for truthfulness of the witness. See FED. R. EvID. 608. Rule 609 governs
impeachment of witnesses with prior convictions. See FED. R. EvID. 609.
11. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a). Even where admissible, such character evidence is
generally only provable through the very generalized forms of reputation or opinion evi-
dence, and not through evidence of specific acts that would illustrate the propensity. On
cross examination, character witnesses may be asked about specific instances, but only to
test the witnesses' knowledge or question their judgment, not to offer a truth about the
character in question. See FED. R. EvID. 405.
12. The examples listed in 404(b), however, are not exhaustive and there are addi-
tional non-character theories for admitting evidence of defendant's uncharged crimes. See
Miguel A. Mendez & Edward J. Imwinkelried, People v. Ewoldt: The California Supreme
Court's About-Face on the Plan Theory for Admitting Evidence of an Accused Uncharged
Misconduct, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 473, 477 (1995). See generally EDWARD J.
IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE 476-80 (1984). As will be dis-
cussed below, courts and prosecutors have been quite inventive in articulating non-
propensity reasons for admitting evidence under 404(b). See infra note 109 and accompa-
nying text.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49
poses, the two most important exceptions to this general scheme are
Federal Rule of Evidence 412 (Rape Shield) and Rule 413. Although
Rape Shield laws vary by jurisdiction, they were all designed to pre-
vent the practice of putting rape survivors on trial and using women's
past sexual activity to prove consent. To varying degrees, they pro-
hibit examining a rape survivor's sexual history." Essentially, Rape
Shield is an exception to an exception. The general rule bans all
character evidence. The exception, provided in Rule 404(a), allows
the accused in a criminal case to raise character issues concerning the
victim. Rape Shield, the exception to that exception, prohibits the ac-
cused from raising the sexual "character" of the victim in a rape case.
The recent and controversial new Federal Rule 413 allows the
prosecutor to introduce the accused's prior similar acts in rape cases.
14
Rule 413 provides that in criminal cases of sexual assault, "evidence
of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of sex-
ual assault is admissible, and ma be considered for its bearing on any
matter to which it is relevant. 5 This means that past instances of
sexual assault may be used to make the generally forbidden propen-
sity argument: if the defendant raped a woman once before, he has
the character of a rapist and probably did it again. 16 Rule 413 repre-
sents a marked departure from traditional character evidence rules.
17
Unlike the Rape Shield rule, which limits an exception to the general
bar against character evidence, this rule expands the scope of admis-
sible character evidence.
B. Reasons Behind the Rules
Scholars and jurists debate the fairness of admitting such charac-
ter evidence, particularly evidence of other bad acts.1 8 Even assuming
13. See FED. R. EVID. 412 (amended in 1994). See infra notes 89-95 and accompa-
nying text.
14. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796,2135 (codified at FED. R. EVID. 413 ). See infra notes 96-143 and
accompanying text.
15. Id.
16. The rules do not admit all character evidence or all arguably relevant specific
wrongs, but are limited instead to evidence of the same type of criminal offenses as those
with which the accused is formally charged. Rule 413 also includes a notice requirement.
The prosecutor must disclose in advance any evidence of the uncharged offenses to the
defendant, including statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testi-
mony that will be offered.
17. See Jeffrey G. Pickett, Note & Comment, The Presumption of Innocence Imper-
iled: The New Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 and The Use of Other Sexual-Offense
Evidence, 70 WASH. L. REv. 883, 884 (1995) (referring to new rules as a "revolution in the
law of evidence").
18. There are many areas in law and life where we use prior acts to draw conclusions
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that such evidence is reliable, a proposition which is itself open to
doubt, character evidence can be invasive, unfair, and prejudicial.
Below, I outline six traditional reasons for excluding character evi-
dence.19
First, character evidence is objectionable because it is, at best,
only minimally relevant to the issues of the trial. In part, this concern
derives from psychological questions surrounding the reliability of
character evidence, particularly in the manner such evidence is pre-
sented in a courtroom.20 People are not predictable characters; many
question whether we can reliably determine how someone behaved
on one particular occasion by reviewing his or her past deeds.21
Second, even if past deeds or proclivities of character are mar-
ginally relevant, character evidence is still objectionable because
whatever little probative value it possesses may be more than offset
by the dangers of jury distraction or confusion. Character evidence
diverts the jury from the facts in the case and allows the jury to be-
come bogged down in the facts of the proof of character.22
Third, juries may overvalue the persuasiveness of character evi-
dence. They will take what is essentially a weak circumstantial argu-
ment-"he did it once, he'll do it again," or "he's the type of person
who would do such a thing"- and prove too much with it. The
worry is that jurors will be overly influenced by prior similar acts and
that their reasoning facilities will be impaired.2 4 Character evidence
about character. As David Leonard observed in a speech to the AALS (Oct., 1996). we
consider it before we hire a babysitter, thereby engaging informally in propensity-type
thinking. Our experience leads us to believe that by knowing someone's past behavior we
can determine his character, and that we can therefore predict something about his be-
havior, or, as in the case with trials, figure out what he did based on his character. David
Leonard, speech to AALS (Oct., 1996).
19. Additionally, administrative concerns about the waste of time and cumulative na-
ture of character evidence also contribute to the general disfavor of character evidence. If
the trait or other similar act is contested, much valuable court time can be wasted proving
the extrinsic issue of character.
20. For an assessment of the psychological value of character evidence, see Miguel A.
Mendez, California's New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code Section 352 and the
Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1003, 1044-59 (1984)., See also
David R. Bryden & Roger C. Park, Other Crimes Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN.
L. REV. 529, 561-62 (1994).
21. See generally Susan M. Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A Reas-
sessment of Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 504,511-33 (1991); FED. R. EvID. 403.
22. This concern echoes the principles of Rule 403, which provides that relevant evi-
dence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its unfair
prejudice.
23. "The natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal ... is to give excessive
weight to the vicious record of crime." IA JOHN HENRY WNIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 58.2 at
1212-13 (Peter Tillers ed., 1983).
24. See David Leonard, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Political Process. 22
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often relies on the proposition that juries can reasonably extrapolate
a reliable pattern of predictable character traits from reputation,
opinion, or isolated events. Psychologically, this is highly doubtful.
An affinity for context and a yearning for understanding the whole
person is not necessarily satisfied by learning about one isolated prior
incident*25
Fourth, the jury may be outraged by the conduct or character
trait and may unconsciously desire to punish the person or accused
for previous misconduct. Punishing someone for prior misconduct,
particularly if the person has already paid his debt to society, is unfair.
Fifth, in a related concern, jurors might ignore the standard of
proof, or at least fret less over reasonable doubt. Whereas jurors
might have agonized over the possibility of convicting an innocent
man, hearing that the accused had committed similar bad acts might
make them less cautious.26 At the very least, the jurors' consciences
are eased because they know that the defendant is not blameless.
Finally, in criminal cases where the first identification is often
through mug shots, the use of character evidence, similar bad acts in
particular, can serve to reinforce unfair police techniques. Allowing
the jury to consider these prior bad acts for propensity purposes
would further disadvantage a group that is already partially selected
by the similarity of their past crimes to the current charge.27
All these arguments about unfair prejudice-that jurors over-
value the evidence, punish the defendant for his personality or past
misdeeds, and may ignore the reasonable doubt standard-are more
than academic quibbling. There is widespread agreement that intro-
duction of such evidence, particularly prior bad acts, affects convic-
tion rates.28 Moreover, as will be discussed in the next section, the
question of whether and when to rely on character evidence trans-
forms from an interesting debate to a compelling dilemma in cases of
rape, where juries tend to disbelieve the victim and uninvolved wit-
nesses are rare.
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305,311 (1995).
25. See Mendez, supra note 20, at 1049.
26. See D. Craig Lewis, Proof and Prejudice: A Constitutional Challenge to the Treat-
ment of Prejudicial Evidence in Federal Criminal Cases, 64 WASH. L. REv. 289, 326 (1989)
(describing "diminished regret about possible error in a determination of guilt when the
fact-finder learns that the accused is an 'evil person."') (quoting RICHARD 0. LEMPERT &
STEPHEN A. SALTZBERG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 213 (1977)).
27. See LEMPERT, A MODERN APPROACH, supra note 26, at 211-12 (describing this
phenomenon with reference to Casablanca's famous order to "round up the usual sus-
pects").
28. See Mendez & Imwinkelried supra note 12, at 474 (citing various studies and em-
pirical evidence that jurors are highly persuaded by evidence of the accused's immoral
conduct).
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H. The Challenge of Rape Trials: A Feminist View
A. Denial of Rape
Rape mars many women's lives and is a fact that is of central
concern to feminists. 9 The specter of rape limits the lives of almost
all women, controlling their movements and participation in the out-
side world.30 Also, rape law and our culture's tolerance of rape goes
to the heart of the relationship between men and women.3
1
Despite a harsher posture on rape reflected in part by recent
changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence,32 our society tolerates, and
some would even say condones, rape.33 The new rules are rooted in
anti-crime rhetoric, replete with class and race stereotyping. Our so-
ciety has adopted punitive attitudes toward those who inflict "real
29. Adrienne Bak Ortolano, the survivor in the Alex Kelly Rape Case, explained the
effect on her life: "'I have been living in constant fear since I was 16... I may look O.K.,
but inside, I am not O.K. I will never be O.K."' Monte Williams, Alex Kelly Receives a 16-
Year Sentence in Girl's 1986 Rape, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1997. at Al. The effect of the rape
on her marriage was severe: "'I have to ask my husband for patience and understanding
because I can't have a normal healthy sexual relationship,"' she said. "'There are normal.
intimate things that a wife and husband should be able to do and I can't do them. This has
consumed my life, my marriage, my family."' Id.
30. See CATHERINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
149 (1989) ("[A]ll women live all the time under the shadow of the threat of sexual
abuse."); see also Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenome-
nological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987) (arguing that
women experience suffering that men do not, and that the legal system trivializes these
gender-based sufferings); P.M. Mazelan, Stereo-Types and Perceptions of the Victims of
Rape, 5 VICTIMOLOGY: AN INT'L J., 121 (1980) (noting that many argue that the fear of
rape affects all women, influencing women's actions, including the way they dress and the
places they go).
31. In fact, much of feminist theory surrounds the power dynamics between the sexes.
Dominance feminism focuses on the power differential between women and men, analyz-
ing women's place in society by examining male subjugation of women, focusing particu-
larly on sex. Dominance feminism traces women's oppression to threats to women's safety
and physical integrity, and argues that women's oppression may be so entrenched that it
has become part of the unconscious cultural order of things. See Kathryn Abrams, Sex
Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory. 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 304
n.1 (1995) (describing Abrams' definition of dominance feminism).
32. See Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322. 108
Stat. 1796, 2135 (codified at FED. R. EvID. 413).
33. "We live in a culture that, at best, condones and, at worst, encourages women to
be perennial victims, men to be continual predators, and sexual relations to be fundamen-
tally aggressive." L. Melani & L. Fodaski, The Psychology of the Rapist and His Victim, in
RAPE: THE FIRST SOURCEBOOK FOR WOMEN 82, 84 (New York Radical Feminists eds.,
1974), quoted in LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM
306-307 (1991). See Paul Pollard, Judgements About Victims and Attackers in Depicted
Rapes: A Review, 31 BRIT. J. OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 307, 326 (1992) (concluding that "rape
may be tacitly condoned in many situations").
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rape, '34 while at the same time disbelieving or dismissing other rape
accounts that are "inconsistent with deep cultural images of 'legiti-
mate' stories of sexual violence., 35 Evaluations of rape articulate
community values, communicating not only through fear of attack,
but also social approbation about how women must behave and under
what circumstances sex against their will is deemed inappropriate and
punishable. Though arguably not conscious, societal disbelief of
women functions as a method of social control, affecting women's
movements by determining what types of behavior and demeanor are
deemed worthy of protection, and what others will be dangerous.
Evidence law, including everything from the formal rules of evidence
to the more customary folk wisdom of trial advocacy techniques, re-
flects this ostensibly ambivalent and complicated attitude toward
rape.
The ways that women's tales of rape are discredited are legion.
Even where the woman's story is technically believed to be true, the
jury often finds sufficient fault with the woman or her behavior (or
both) so that it refuses to label her a victim or to punish the rapist.36
Admittedly, some of this disbelief is attributable to questions about
the nature of the crime itself. Where the defense is consent, there are
often no witnesses other than the accused and the victim, and serious
disagreements arise over what happened. However, this factor tends
to be overemphasized by those who do not detect gender politics in
the so-called "swearing matches" between the victim and the ac-
cused.37
34. The term "real rape" was originally coined by SusanEstrich who wrote a book by
the same name in which she argues that the law prosecutes and treats aggravated rapes
involving violence from a stranger more seriously than acquaintance rapes. I use the term
to include any rape that fits within the cultural paradigm. See SuSAN ESTRICH, REAL
RAPE (1987).
35. COOMBS, supra note 7, at 278.
36. This is what Lynne Henderson calls the assumption of female guilt and male in-
nocence. Henderson observes that the dominant cultural story of heterosexuality holds
women morally responsible for the sexual conduct of both and hold men morally respon-
sible for neither. See Lynne Henderson, Getting to Know: Honoring Women in Law and
in Fact, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & LAW 41, 43, 51 (1993); COOMBS supra note 7, at 280 (offering
"a useful heuristic device to think about the situations in which fact finders discredit
women's claims of sexual violation by dividing them into two categories: 'Not True' and
'So What"'); see also Katharine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and
Relevancy in Rape Law, 110 HARV. L REV. 563, 586-89 (discussing blaming the rape vic-
tim and distinguishing between jury disbelief of women and jury disregard of harm to
women who breach sex-role expectations).
37. The conundrum posed by these so-called "swearing matches" seems overstated.
To convict, the jury would have to believe that the accused forced a woman to have sex
and now is lying about it to avoid prosecution. To acquit, the jury would have to have rea-
sonable concern that the victim is making it all up or is out of touch with reality. The pur-
ported reasons that women might be lying include: conniving to cover for an unintended
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There are compelling explanations for this disbelief of women's
stories of rape. First, even when the circumstances are not physically
brutal and do not involve added torture, rapes are painful events.
Sexual behavior is rarely talked about openly in public, even in the
context of love and mutual respect. Discomfort and psychological
distancing regarding the sex acts of rape are prodigious.38
Second, although men are also victims of rape,39 outside the
prison population the issue separates into a huge gender divide: men
are usually the perpetrators and women are usually the victims. This
factor makes talking about rape necessarily fraught with sexual poli-
tics. Women charging rape go unheeded, in part, because women in
the courtroom (as well as the street or the boardroom) are often not
heard or taken seriously.40 There is an additional level of discomfi-
ture about rape because in keeping with their roles in interpreting the
rape narrative, men will identify with the perpetrator, women with
the victim. Also, suspicions about the rape victim are reinforced by
some general differences in communication-in style and substance-
between men and women.41
pregnancy, making excuses for not being a virgin, vindictiveness for love scorned, a desire
to sue the accused for a large amount of money or regret for unpleasant consensual sex.
None of these reasons seem likely for pursuing a criminal case for rape. Given the hu-
miliation (diminished somewhat by Rape Shield laws), heartache, public exposure, time.
and inconvenience, it seems unlikely that many women would invent rapes. Thus, our ac-
ceptance of the swearing-match explanation seems, as a matter of course, suspect.
38. "I - I do believe that despite the enormous progress that has been made clearly
in terms of awareness and prosecution of rape cases, they are still not treated the same as
other violent crimes because sex is involved, and we're - we're nuts about sex in our soci-
ety." The Geraldo Rivera Show: Funny, He Doesn't Look Like A Rapist (ABC television
broadcast, June 25, 1997).
39. The effects of sexual assault on male survivors are traumatic, and may be quite
similar to women's documented reactions to sexual assault, including shame and denial.
See generally GILLIAN C. MEZEY & MICHAEL B. KING, MALE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL
ASSAULT (1992).
40. This disbelief and desire to silence women are rooted in our western tradition's
suspicion of women's talk and the danger of women's seductive powers. Starting with
Eve, it seems Western culture has been convinced that women tempt men and get them in
trouble. "[Women's] role is to learn, listening quietly and with due submission. I do not
permit women to teach or to dictate to men; they should keep quiet. For Adam was cre-
ated first, and Eve afterwards; moreover it was not Adam who was deceived; it was the
woman who, yielding to deception, fell into sin." 1 Timothy 2:10-14. "Yos6 ben Yochanan
of Jerusalem says: Do not engage in too much idle talk with women. This has been said
even with regard to one's own wife; how much more does it apply to the wife of one's
neighbor. Accordingly, the Sages said: He who engages in too much idle talk with women
brings trouble on himself; he neglects the study of the Torah and will in the end inherit
Gehinnom [an evil afterlife]." Chapters of the Fathers I: 5 (1967) [R. Samson Raphael
Hirsch trans.]
41. Linguistic and anthropological studies indicate that women and other subordi-
nated groups employ speech patterns and communication strategies that are perceived as
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Third, and most important, is the process of denial.42 Women's
stories of rape paint a terrifying portrait of their everyday lives.43 To
blame the woman for where she walked or what she wore is also a
form of denial. Implicit in that accusation is the erroneous notion
that a woman who walks in the right places or dresses correctly can
shield herself from rape. Rather than acknowledge that women are in
danger, society looks for psychological comfort by denying the prob-
lem and concluding that the victim must be lying, or at least exagger-
ating.44 One form of denial ascribes to the woman's reasons for lying,
such as vindictiveness, fear of being perceived as willingly sexual, or
less credible in the courtroom. Hallmarks of this powerless speech include tentativeness,
hedging, hiding statements within questions, and using modifiers that tend to undermine
the content of the statement. These patterns reinforce the hierarchy of speakers and in-
vite the listener to discount the speaker personally and substantively. See Barbara
Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in
Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 533, 583-84 (1992) (citing ROBIN LAKOFF,
LANGUAGE AND WOMAN'S PLACE (1975) and studies by William O'Barr in which jurors
asked to assess witnesses' testimony after hearing tapes of identical transcripts in both
powerful and powerless styles, assessed the powerless style speakers as less credible); see
also HUNTER, supra note 4, at 165 (noting that women's speech patterns, "such as 'ums,'
rising intonations, and hesitancy, are associated with powerlessness"); John M. Conley et
al., The Power of Language: Presentational Style in the Courtroom, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1375,
1380 (defining a powerless speech style and noting that the style is used more frequently
by female witnesses); Peggy C. Davis, Contextual Legal Criticism: A Demonstration Ex-
ploring Hierarchy and "Feminine" Style, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1635, 1647-54 (1991) (discuss-
ing discourse patterns associated with gender, including signs of uncertainty). A look at
popular culture indicates the pervasiveness of belief in the differences in gender communi-
cation style, such as the recently popular Broadway hit Defending the Caveman, and the
Men Are From Mars, Women Are From Venus book genre.
42. People use the psychological defense mechanism of denial to screen out distress-
ing realities and the resultant painful feelings. See Christine Adams, Note, Mothers Who
Fail to Protect Their Children from Sexual Abuse: Addressing the Problem of Denial, 12
YALE L. & POL'Y. REv. 519, 521 (citing KARIN C. MEISELMAN, RESOLVING THE
TRAUMA OF INCEST 8 (1990)). In psychoanalytic terms, denial is a way for the ego to re-
press painful facts and thoughts by crowding them out of consciousness. See David S.
Caudill, Freud and Critical Legal Studies: Contours of a Radical Socio-Legal Psychoanaly-
sis, 66 IND. LJ. 651, 658-59 (1991) (citing C. HALL, A PRIMER OF FREUDIAN
PSYCHOLOGY 96 (1954)). Denial can happen on an individual level (such as an alcoholic
who denies having a drinking problem) or can affect an entire society (such as German
villagers who claimed to be unaware of Nazi genocide in nearby concentration camps).
See id. at 661; see generally DANIEL GOLEMAN, VITAL LIES, SIMPLE TRUTHS: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-DECEPTION (1985) (describing society-wide denial).
43. According to the Surgeon General, violence from men is the greatest health
threat to American women. See Steven Bennet Weisburd & Brian Levin, "On the Basis of
Sex": Recognizing Gender-Based Bias Crimes, STAN. L. & POL'Y REV., Spring 1994, at 21,
32.
44. See FINAL REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON
GENDER ISSUES IN THE COURTS 24 (1989) (revealing the belief that women lie or exag-
gerate about domestic violence), cited in HUNTER, supra note 4, at 135 n.50.
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hiding pregnancy.45 As part of the process of denial, jurors will look
to things that don't add up. Professor Kim Lane Scheppele observes
that abused and sexually assaulted women may exhibit many of the
characteristics commonly associated with liars-they delay in report-
ing, change their stories, and sound equivocal because of self-blame. 46
Another form of denial is to see rape as exceptional or unusual.47
Despite the statistics,48 people tend to see rape as drastically diver-
gent from typical interactions between men and women.49 Because it
is viewed as wildly aberrational, the threat of rape seems more dis-
tant, and hence less threatening. °
45. For instance, Kelly's attorney, Thomas Puccio, portrayed the survivor as "a good
Catholic girl from a good Catholic family who cried rape when she lost her virginity,"
quoted in Turning Point, supra note 8. According to the New York Times, in his defense
of Mr. Kelly, Mr. Puccio said Ms. Ortolano had "concocted a tale of rape out of shame of
losing her virginity in the back of a Jeep to an 18-year-old she had just met, a youth with
whom she would have no future because he had a girlfriend." Williams, supra note 8.
46. See Schappele, supra note 4, at 126-27. For instance, in Alex Kelly's mistrial, one
of the jurors reported being troubled by the fact that the survivor did not report the rape
until the next day. See Glaberson, supra note 9.
47. Professor Coombs has observed that "it is in [men's] gendered interest to believe
rape and sexual harassment are rare events, attributable only to monsters: these situations
have nothing to do with their own lives and require no reexamination of their own behav-
ior." Coombs, supra note 7, at 285. Accord Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered
Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11 (1991); Scheppele, su-
pra note 4, at 142; Joan S. Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological
and Legal Perspectives of Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1295, 1311 (1993) (skepticism of women's stories "is far easier than acceptance of the real-
ity that so many men are so dangerous, and that there is little (or nothing) many women
can do on their own to be safe.")
48. Recent victim surveys indicate that approximately 500,000 women are victims of
some sort of rape or sexual assault, yet in 1994, only approximately 100,000 rapes were
reported and only approximately 37,000 arrests were made for forcible rape. See Brydan
& Lengnick, supra note 2, at 1211.
49. See Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a
Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1022 (1991); see also SUSAN
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975); cf Lisa Marie
DeSanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for Victims of Do-
mestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 371 (1996) ("[J]urors, like all other mem-
bers of society, would much rather believe that heinous crimes do not happen, and that at
the very least, they do not happen without good cause .... Thus, the jury is predisposed
to want this charge of violence to be a mistake, a misunderstanding, an accident, or a
lie.").
50. A related form of denial, deriving from the "just world" hypothesis, rests on the
belief that the woman is somehow at fault. "'Just world" theory posits that people have an
intense psychological need to view the world as a fair place because this perception pro-
vides a sense of control over their lives. See K.D. McCall et al., Understanding Attribu-
tions of Victim Blame for Rape: Sex, Violence and Foreseeability, 20 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1, 3 (1990). The "just world" theory predicts that people will blame a rape vic-
tim to maintain the belief that the world is fair, people get what they deserve, and there is
a sense of order over the environment. Part of the denial of rape is a search for victim be-
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B. The Cultural Paradigm
To understand how and why this denial of women's experience
works, we must scrutinize the various stories-the heuristic models of
rape-against which the jurors measure the victim's story.5
According to Taslitz, jurors use their past experiences or cultural
assumptions, much the way a judge uses precedent, to interpret an
event. Patriarchal scripts are the most available and persuasive to ju-
rors. These patriarchal scripts form the basis of the rape story. In
fact, story credibility and structural coherence are better explanations
of juror reasoning than logical proof 5 2 What is the rape story? In its
barest form, our cultural story of rape is a tale of female chastity and
male perfidy. The prototypical fable of rape, what I will refer to as
the cultural paradigm, relies on cultural rape myths.5 3 It involves a
heroine-young, attractive, respectable-who has been brutally at-
tacked and raped despite fierce resistance. At the time of the rape,
she is modestly dressed and where she is supposed to be. She has no
promiscuous past or lascivious inclinations5 4  Thus she has done
nothing, be it seductive or incautious, to "invite" the violent attack.
She reports this violation immediately. The anti-hero of this fable is
the brutish male aggressor. He is a sex-crazed, deviant sociopath. He
has no previous acquaintance with the victim. He is violent and sadis-
havior which "caused" the rape thereby differentiating and distancing oneself from the
victim. 1d; see also Mazelan, supra note 30, at 122. If the victim somehow deserved or at
least contributed to her rape, it seems less horrifying and the world appears to be a safer
place.
51. Professor Mary Coombs calls these prototypical rape stories the "cultural scripts"
of rape. Coombs, supra note 7, at 3. Professor Andrew Taslitz refers to them as "patriar-
chal stories" and demonstrates how these recurrent cultural narratives of rape communi-
cate and reinforce the assumptions of the patriarchal system. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Pa-
triarchal Stories 1: Cultural Rape Narratives in the Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. REv. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 387, 439 (1996). Taslitz explains that stories and storytelling are essential
to individual's memory and understanding of themselves and their relation to the world.
See id. at 436. People are able to understand and communicate with others because they
share common cultural stories. This is particularly true in the case of jury trials where the
jurors try to piece together a coherent narrative of the events.
52. See id at 426-28. Taslitz also provides strategic and legal solutions to the prob-
lems presented by such patriarchal stories in rape cases. See id.
53. Rape myths are empirically untrue, but are nevertheless firmly held notions about
the incidence and nature of rape. Rape myths are defined as "prejudicial, stereotyped, or
false beliefs about rape, rape victims, and rapists." Torrey, supra note 49, at 1017-18 (cit-
ing Martha R. Burt, Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape, 38 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 217, 229-30 (1980)). For instance, one rape myth is that rape is an unusual
event. See Baker, supra note 36, at 563 ("Many men rape. They have all done something
very wrong. Most of them have not done something particularly extraordinary.").
54. In a survey of seventeen hundred Rhode Island sixth to ninth graders, thirty-one
percent of the boys and thirty-two percent of the girls believed it would not be improper to
rape a woman who is sexually active. See Torrey, supra note 49, at 1021-22.
Mar. 1998] NO BAD MEN!
tic, using extreme force to violate his victim. He is a "loser" who has
no girlfriend.55
(1) Cultural Profile of the Rapist
Our cultural paradigm of rape reflects various rape myths pur-
porting to describe men who rape. For our purposes the most perti-
nent myths are: (1) "nice" (well educated, white,5 6 middle class, em-
ployed) men do not rape;5 (2) only men who cannot secure normal
consensual sex resort to rape.58 Some psychologists have created a
"loser scale: variables such as being unmarried, being childless, being
unemployed, lacking a sexual partner and presenting a negative ap-
pearance to jurors all lead to convictions.59 In truth, many men rape
and even more say they would do so if they were sure they could get
away with it.60 Interestingly, one strong predictor of a rapist is a sub-
scription to various myths about rape. Men who believe these rape
myths are more likely to report that under the appropriate circum-
55. See generally, HELEN BENEDICT, VIRGIN OR VAMP (1992) (discussing media's
reliance on rape myths in portraying rapists and victims).
56. Both Professor Taslitz and Professor Katharine Baker discuss the role of race and
racism in rape culture. See Baker, supra note 36, at 594-97; see also Taslitz, supra note 51
at 453-59.
57. See Coombs, supra note 7, at 281 ("Rapists are aggressive, uncouth, lower-class
strangers, probably African-American or Hispanic.").
58. See Torrey, supra note 49, at 1040. Professor Coombs quotes reactions to William
Kennedy Smith being charged with rape. One court watcher said, "I just find it hard to
believe that someone with that much money would have to resort to rape to get what he
wants." Coombs, supra note 7, at 301 n.96. A similar statement was made by the U.S.
Military about soldiers who raped a girl in Japan (they had money, they could have gone
to a prostitute, therefore they are innocent). Certainly Alex Kelly, in securing his first
hung jury, used this rape myth to his advantage, always appearing in the company of his
girlfriend, and projecting the image of a nice young man who could easily attract women
to his bed without resorting to force. See Geraldo Rivera, supra note 38 ("So there's this
nagging suspicion... that the woman did something to bring about her own violation.
And that's especially the case when the perpetrator's a good looking, popular, wealthy,
well-connected guy. Alex Kelly does not look like a rapist. I'm sorry. He's walking every
day. Amy - Amy Molitor [Kelly's girlfriend] is holding on to his hand. His mom's there.
His dad's there. His family loves him. She's been suffering - the girlfriend's been suf-
fering for years. She's still by his side. And anyway, those girls were probably just dying
to get, you know - you know, be - made love to by this guy.").
59. See Bryden and Lengnick, supra note 2, at 127.
60. In one experiment, 30% of the men polled indicated that if they would not be
caught, there would be some likelihood of their raping (rating themselves two or above on
a five-point scale). See James V.P. Check & Neil M. Malamuth, Sex-Role Stereotyping and
Reactions to Depictions of Stranger versus Acquaintance Rape, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 344, 346-47 (1983). According to Torrey, one study found that over half the
college-age male population surveyed would rape if they were assured that they would not
be caught or punished. Torrey, supra note 49, at 1023.
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stances they might commit rape.61
(2) Cultural Profile of the Survivor
Many myths surround the survivor of rape, including general
stereotypes of women as vindictive, hysterical, and unreliable narra-
tors. I will focus here on four myths peculiar to rape.
The traditional image of a rapist as a "knife wielding maniac un-
known to his attacker62 is simply false.63 According to psychological
studies, prior romantic involvement with the attacker mitigates the
perceived seriousness of the rape and is seen as a potential justifica-
tion for sexual attack.64 Arguably, stranger rapes are perceived to be
prototypical and much more likely to be taken seriously.65 Defen-
dants in stranger rapes are much more likely to argue mistaken iden-
tity. However, in acquaintance rape cases it's essential for the de-
fense to discredit the rape victim's perception and credibility.66 Jurors
tend to discredit acquaintance rape victims who acknowledge having
sexual involvement with the defendant in the past both, because it
seems likely to the jury that she consented again and because it indi-
cates a motive for fabricating a rape charge.67 For instance, Alex
Kelly called an expert sexologist who testified that the victim's hys-
teria could have resulted from guilt and anxiety over her first sexual
experience.68 Also, Kelly's attorney argued that the victim lied out of
shame. Furthermore, a tale of a woman's sexual reluctance is not
necessarily disturbing because it is consistent with a belief that
61. See K.D. McCall et al., Understanding Attributions of Victim Blame for Rape: Sex,
Violence and Foreseeability, 20 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 3 (1990); Check & Mala-
muth, supra note 60, at 345-47 (noting a higher percentage of men who report they might
rape among those who scored high for beliefs in sexual stereotypes). Many clinical reports
support the finding that rapists believe in rape myths and tend to have callous perceptions
of their victim's reaction to being raped. See id. at 346.
62. Bryden and Lengnick, supra note 2, at 1202 (quoting Susan Estrich).
63. See Check & Malamuth, supra note 60, at 344-45.
64. In an article entitled Judgements About Victims and Attackers in Depicted Rapes:
A Review, Professor Paul Pollard canvasses the extensive literature on attribution of vic-
tim responsibility in rape. Pollard, supra note 33, at 312. Most of the research was con-
ducted on American undergraduates who evaluated vignettes about rape. Although psy-
chology experiments cannot replicate the conditions of a jury, the use of vignettes fits
nicely with the story-model of jury thinking. Pollard speculates that the failure to define
sexual attack as rape occurs because of the belief that such attacks are justified in certain
circumstances. See id; but see Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 2, at 1273 (no different out-
come under Michigan's most stringent and advanced rape shield law).
65. See id;- Taslitz, supra note 51, at 469.
66. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 2, at 1204.
67. See SUSANNA ADLER, RAPE ON TRIAL 89-93 (1987), quoted in Bryden & Leng-
nick, supra note 2, at 1201.
68. See Elizabeth Gleick, The Fugitive Goes on Trial, TIME, Nov. 4, 1996, at 84.
Mar. 1998]
women, uncomfortable with sexuality, muster only token resistance.
This dynamic is reflected in cultural beliefs about dating, including
such gems as "her lips say no but her eyes say yes.",69 This conceptu-
alization of sex as feigned struggle leads to a tolerance of coerced sex.
Moreover, struggle is seen as part of normal dating behavior and dif-
ferent from rape.
70
Second, there is the related belief that women, who are either
sexually confused, vindictive, or trying to cover up some indiscretion,
71have a strong incentive to lie about rape.
Third is the myth that women use their sexual wiles as a basis for
controlling men, or at least getting what they want from them. In this
view, a sexual act is often seen as a bargained-for exchange between a
man and a woman.72 In psychological experiments, subjects justified
coerced sex based on various factors including whether the man paid
for dinner or the woman expressed sexual interest.73  One prominent
and particularly alarming aspect of this rape myth is that a woman on
a date who receives dinner or presents "owes" the man sex.74
Fourth is the belief that women are somehow to blame for being
raped if their behavior facilitated the rape in some way.75 For exam-
69. Torrey, supra note 49, at 1015 (elaborating on the familiar rape myth that no
really means yes).
70. See id. at 344.
71. See Coombs, supra note 7, at 280-85 (discussing cultural explanations including
the "woman scorned" theory of why women would lie about rape). Over fifty percent of
Americans believe that fifty percent or more of reported rapes are only reported because
the woman is trying to get back at a man or cover an illegitimate pregnancy. See Torrey,
supra note 49, at 1018.
72. In fact, even so-called champions of rape reform subscribe to this view. Professor
Donald Dripps has advocated a crime akin to theft of services for unconsented intercourse
without the use of force. See Donald Dripps, Men, Women, and Rape, 63 Fordham L.
Rev. 125, 144 (1994). He offers examples such as the widow who has sex with the banker
in order to avoid foreclosure, as an example of a reasonable bargained-for exchange of a
woman's sexual favors for something a man can give her. See id. at 169.
73. This may also explain why previous acquaintance between rapist and victim is a
significant factor in blaming the victim. See Pollard, supra note 33, at 309-10. Another
factor is the issue of victim resistance where victims who do not resist were rated to have
been harmed less and were deemed to be less credible. Pollard concludes, however, that
because of conflicting research no firm conclusion can be drawn on the affect of resistance.
See id. at 313; but see ESTRICH, supra note 34.
74. "In a survey of 1700 sixth to ninth graders from Rhode Island, 24% of the boys
and 16% of the girls said it is acceptable for a man to force a woman to have sex with him
if he has spent money on her." Torrey, supra note 49, at 1021.
75. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 2, at 1254 (citing Kalven & Zeisel study that
showed juries, in non-violent rape cases, often apply a form psuedo-assumption of the risk
and contributory fault, because the victim's conduct somehow brought on the rape):
Coombs, supra note 7, at 283 ("[R]ape myths are doubly dangerous when the woman was
sexually active or when she 'misbehaved' on the occasion in question by drinking alcohol
or dressing provocatively.") (footnote omitted). For instance, Alex Kelly's attorney fo-
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pie, Alex Kelly's attorney focused his defense on the fact that the sur-
vivor was drinking or might have taken drugs.76 A prominent Con-
necticut defense attorney, William F. Dow III, commented on jury
selection in Kelly's case: "Contrary to what many people think, I
would consider people somewhat older, who might feel that the com-
plaining witnesses put themselves in a position where intimate rela-
tions were inevitable.,
77
Abundant evidence from psychology experiments indicates that
various rape myths and other sexist stereotypes play a vital role in de-
termining whether and how much the victim is held responsible. Be-
haviors that increase the risk of victimization often tend to correlate
with behaviors that violate generally understood sex roles.78  Survi-
vors are held more accountable and their attackers less so where the
woman is out late at night or where she accepts a lift from a stranger.
Women who push the limits of their sex roles by doing things such as
being outside their homes unaccompanied late at night, risk, and
some might even say invite, rape. Other factors enhancing victim
blame include her reputation (including her sexual history)," attrac-
cused his defense on the fact that the survivor was drinking or might have taken drugs.
See William Glaberson, Defense to Use Alcohol As Issue in Rape Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2,
1996, at B6 (discussing the blame-the-victim strategy). A prominent Connecticut defense
attorney, William F. Dow III, commented on jury selection in Kelly's case: "Contrary to
what many people think, I would consider people somewhat older, who might feel that the
complaining witnesses put themselves in a position where intimate relations were inevita-
ble." Steven Fromm, The Crux of the Kelly Case, THE CONNEcrICUT LAW TRIBUNE,
Sept. 30, 1996, at 2.
76. See Glaberson, supra note 75.
77. Fromm, supra note 75,at 2.
78. For instance, Pollard cites research that longer sentences were recommended for
rape of a married woman than for rape of a virgin or divorced woman. Pollard speculates
that this distinction is both because married women are considered more "reputable" and
because of the sexist notion that women are commodities and the husband's rights of sex-
ual access had been diminished by the rape of his wife. See Pollard, supra note 33, at 308-
09 (citing Jones & Aronson and Kanekar & Kolsawalla (1977)). Interestingly, people with
more traditional sexual attitudes are more likely to attribute responsibility to the victim of
the rape, blaming the woman for deviating from the sexual norms. See id. at 317-21.
The influence of alcohol presents an often interesting example. In psychology experi-
ments, an inebriated rape victim was viewed less sympathetically and was deemed to have
contributed to her harm. An inebriated attacker, however, was deemed to be less respon-
sible for his actions. One theory for this discrepancy is that it is inappropriate for women
to be drunk but acceptable for men. See iL at 314-15. The role of sexism in blaming the
victim is particularly apparent in vignettes that used men as rape victims. In these vi-
gnettes, men were perceived as much less blameworthy than women victims for the same
types of behavior such as hitchhiking or jogging at the time of the rape. See id at 318.
79. Less reputable victims were thought to be more blameworthy. The absence of
casual partners was clearly part of the definition of respectability, a survivor with many
casual relationships was considered responsible for the attack in large measure. Although
victim-attacker acquaintance cannot itself be verified as a factor for enhanced victim
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tiveness,80 and manner of dress.81
C. The Paradigm in Action
When a rape is reported, it may be measured by everyone-
friends, police 82, prosecutors, 83 and most important for our purposes,
jurors84-against the patriarchal tale of rape that our culture
inculcates and that we use to measure the credibility of any given
charge of rape. Deviation from the paradigm may prompt juries to
believe that no rape occurred or that the incident was the victim's
fault. This cultural paradigm of rape serves at least four interrelated
functions.
First, as with any other paradigm or cognitive model, it assists the
fact-finder in ordering and comprehending the narrative. It is, there-
fore, an organizing mechanism for making sense out of a conflicting
tale.
Second, the cultural rape fable fosters denial by discrediting rape
stories that fall outside its purview.85 Jurors sense that the prior story
is somehow insufficient. Rape stories that do not fit social myths and
preconceptions will not comport with traditional assumptions, and ju-
blame, the research subjects were much more likely to attribute blame to the victim if the
rape occurred on a date. See id. at 311.
80. Less attractive victims were deemed more blameworthy because, unlike the at-
tractive victims who are assumed to be naturally enticing, the evaluators believe that the
unattractive women must have done something to invite all that attention. See id. at 311.
Since the rape myth is about sexual desire, an unattractive woman was supposed to have
somehow facilitated her own attack by trying to arouse the man's desires.
81. Provocative dress by the victim leads to blaming the victim either because of a
"just world" hypothesis that she was not exercising due care or because of the image of
woman as vixen, tantalizing men and frustrating them sexually. This focus on dress em-
phasizes the sexual rather than the violent aspect of rape. See Check & Malamuth, supra
note 63, at 345.
82. There is evidence that police are highly influenced by rape myths. A rape vic-
tim's background and character can even affect the way reports are classified by police.
See Mazelan, supra note 30, at 121.
83. See Coombs, supra note 7, at 292 (discussing the effects of rape myths on prosecu-
tors).
84. Psychological surveys indicate that jurors will operate based on such myths con-
cerning victim behavior. See Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries and Expert Evi-
dence: Social Framework Testimony, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 155-58 (1989).
Vidmar and Schuller cite extensive evidence from the psychological literature that laypeo-
pie accept rape myths supporting the view that "the average juror may have inadequate
information about rape or may hold attitudes that would predispose him or her to be skep-
tical of complainant testimony in a trial involving a consent defense." Id. In one socio-
logical study cited by Mary Coombs, jurors explained their acquittals in rape trial with
such explanations as "[S]he led him on. [She] accepted a ride in the middle of the night.'
Coombs, supra note 7, at 284 (quoting GARY D. LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 218 (1989)).
85. See Taslitz, supra note 51, at 434-35.
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ries are able to discount them as incoherent or unpersuasive.86
Third, by defining rape in a way that ignores much sexual vio-
lence against women, the rape paradigm maintains the status quo. It
discredits victims and silences them (enhancing the ability to deny the
problem because we don't have to hear about it), implicitly asserting
that the current situation isn't so bad. To the extent that one sees
rape and, more importantly, the threat of rape as a mechanism lim-
iting women's independence, the paradigm reinforces this method of
social control.
Fourth, the rape paradigm dehumanizes and marginalizes perpe-
trators. A distant, dysfunctional, and diabolical cousin to the boy
next door, the rapist is seen as a sex-crazed monster. He is not a co-
worker or a date or anyone else a woman might know. This stilted
and empirically inaccurate demographic of the rapist allows people to
dismiss the magnitude of the problem and lets many men off the
hook. By demonizing a chosen few who are branded as deviant, the
vast majority of men appear blameless and the world seems safe for
women who are willing to adhere to the restrictions of their gender-
roles.
I. Evaluating the Potential Character-Based Solutions
In analyzing character evidence from a feminist viewpoint I dis-
tinguish between those solutions that enrich the rape narrative told at
the trial and those that impoverish it.88 By "enrich" or "enhance" the
narrative, I refer to solutions that allow the jury to listen to the rape
survivor, and expand its appreciation of the nature of rape. By "im-
poverish" the narrative, I refer to methods of gaining convictions that
are disrespectful of the survivor or of all women, drawing upon rape
myths, and otherwise reinforcing the cultural paradigm and ultimately
(even if they secure convictions) injuring the interests of women.
86. What emerges is a picture of jury behavior that reflects what we know about soci-
ety generally. Influenced by unconscious and unarticulated patriarchal values transmitted
and reinforced through stories, jurors have trouble seeing anything that deviates from the
classical patriarchal story as rape. Torrey outlines what she calls cognitive inflexibility
where jurors find that the rape story does not fit with their cognitive structure of what rape
should be like. See Torrey, supra note 49, at 1050 (citing DONALD E. VINSON, JURY
TRIALS: PSYCHOLOGY OF WINNING STRATEGY (1986)).
87. The 'likelihood of a rape complaint actually ending in conviction is generally es-
timated at 2%-5%.' Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 2, at 1210.
88. I do not deal here with the substantive issues in rape law such as the corrobora-
tion requirement or the rule that resistance by the victim is an essential element of the
crime.
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A. The Good: Rape Shield
The most important rule of character evidence from a feminist
standpoint is the special ban of Rape Shield. Rape Shield laws,
adopted first by the Federal Rules of Evidence and then by almost
every state, prohibit intrusive questions about the victim's sexual his-
tory and "character" for chastity.8 9 Without the protection of Rape
Shield, evidence about the victim could arguably be admissible under
the Rule 404(a)(2) exception, which permits the accused to raise per-
tinent character traits about the victim.90 In criminal cases, the ban is
not absolute. It allows "evidence of specific instances of sexual be-
havior by the alleged victim offered to prove that a person other than
the accused was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evi-
dence" and "evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the
alleged victim with respect to the person accused of the sexual mis-
conduct offered by the accused to prove consent or by the prosecu-
tion." Rule 412 also provides an undefined exclusion where failure to
admit the evidence "would violate the constitutional rights of the de-
fendant."
Traditionally, Rape Shield is justified on grounds of logic, hu-
manity, and necessity. On a strictly logical basis, one can argue that
what a woman has done in the past in her sex life has little or no
bearing on whether she agreed to have sex on a particular occasion.
(Men are not fungible and even the same man can be desired on one
occasion and rejected on another). From the perspective of basic
human decency, Rape Shield is desirable because it prevents humili-
ating questions that embarrass victims who have already suffered
considerably. Thus, Rape Shield laws help cabin unfair prejudice
against the victim and limit the introduction of irrelevant evidence.
In terms of the cultural paradigm, Rape Shield deprives the jury
of precisely the type of information that feeds rape myths and thereby
poisons the narrative. Withholding information about the victim
counteracts unfair prejudices about the woman's activities, dress or
89. The Federal Rape Shield statute excludes "(1) evidence offered to prove that any
alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior; and (2) evidence offered to prove any
alleged victim's sexual predisposition." FED. R. EvID. 412. The advisory committee also
interpreted the prohibition on the victim's "sexual behavior" to include "the alleged vic-
tim's mode of dress, speech, or lifestyle." FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
90. I say "arguably" because I think that, even absent Rape Shield, a victim's sexual
history is not pertinent to whether she was raped on one particular occasion and hence
outside the exception of 404(a)(2). FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2) ("Evidence of a pertinent
trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by the accused .... ). Nonetheless,
the pervasiveness of rape myths and the cultural importance of previous sexual history
raise the question of whether a judge or jury would be able to transcend the paradigm and
see such facts as irrelevant. Rape Shield laws came about in response to real abuses.
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sexual history, and prevents the jury from relying on the rape myth
that the survivor "asked" to be raped. 91 In constructing the narrative
of what happened in the case before them, jurors cannot as easily rely
on the paradigm for a culturally comfortable answer (e.g., she was
dressed scantily, she must have wanted sex, therefore no rape oc-
curred). By depriving the jury of this information, the rules of evi-
dence actually facilitate more deliberation and thought.92
Rape Shield laws serve not only to focus the trial and eliminate
irrelevant, distracting, and potentially prejudicial information, they
also serve the policy of promoting rape prosecutions, particularly be-
cause the sponsors of these laws intended them to serve as a model
for the states.93 By sparing women trauma, Rape Shield encourages
reporting and allows the government to prosecute rape cases.
Rape Shield laws are commendable in their desire to limit jury's
access to a victim's sexual history, but they do not change the atti-
tudes so much as limit their applicability by withholding information.
Even when sexual' history evidence is excluded under Rape Shield,
the victim's so-called contributory negligence and other non-
91. See Scheppele, supra note 4, at 154-55.
92. Certainly there is controversy surrounding Rape Shield. Some of it arises out of a
failure to understand the lure of rape myths and ends up sounding like Henry Higgins'
complaint: "Why can't a woman be more like a man?" Others who accept the basic prin-
ciples of Rape Shield, raise Sixth Amendment constitutional concerns about an accused's
right to question the victim, arguing that Rule 412's constitutional exception must be trig-
gered frequently to protect the accused. See, e.g., Merry C. Evans, The Missouri Supreme
Court Confronts the Sixth Amendment in Its Interpretation of the Rape Victim Shield Stat-
ute, 52 Mo. L. REv. 925, 926-27 (1987); Frank Tuerkheimer, A Reassessment and Redefi-
nition of Rape Shield Laws, 50 OHio ST. L.J. 1245, 1262-69 (1989); J. Alexander Tanford
& Anthony J. Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L.
REV. 544,582-83 (1980); Pamela J. Fisher, Comment, State v. Alvey: Iowa's Victimization
of Defendants Through the Overextension of Iowa's Rape Shield Law, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 835,
835-36 (1990) (expressing concern over defendant who because of rape shield would not
be allowed to bring up the woman's past false charges of rape). For an interesting re-
sponse to these concerns, see Elizabeth Kessler, Pattern of Sexual Conduct Evidence and
Present Consent: Limiting the Admissibility of Sexual History Evidence in Rape (written
before the new version of Rule 412, and arguing that pattern evidence is "poorly applied
and frequently misused."); see also Ann Althouse, Thelma and Louise and the Law: Do
Rape Shield Rules Matter, 25 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 757, 764 (1992) (demonstrating how
Rape Shield law can be undermined by judges' and jurors' mistrust of the rape survivor
and that judges often apply "generous interpretation to the rape shield exceptions"). I am
more sympathetic to the critique that Rape Shield does not go far enough. Given myths
about acquaintance rape and the vindictiveness of women who charge rape, some observ-
ers would contain the Rape Shield exceptions, allowing the jury to learn about prior sex
with the accused only insofar as that is necessary to tell a coherent story. See Taslitz, supra
note 51, at 391, 392.
93. See 137 CONG. REc. S3191, S3239 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991) ("The proposed new
rules would apply directly in federal cases, and would have broader significance as a po-
tential model for state reforms.").
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traditional behaviors will often be revealed during the testimony
about events surrounding the rape.94
Obviously in our current media age the woman is not protected
from all such intrusive and demeaning characterizations, many of
which are made outside the courtroom. For instance, Alex Kelly's at-
torney tapped into rape myths concerning how "real" victims behave
when he asserted that Ms. Ortolano and her family were "unvictim
victims" who enjoyed coming to court "totally coifed and dressed to
kill., 95 And even though the Rape Shield law prohibited the defense
from raising questions of the victim's character, the unfolding of the
rape story permitted the jury to hear that the victim was an underage
minor who drank at a party, knew Alex Kelly, and accepted his offer
of a ride home. Arguably, it spares women trauma and encourages
reporting, thereby facilitating arrests and prosecutions for rape. The
mere exclusion of affirmative reference to stereotypes and otherwise
irrelevant sexual information, however, cannot, alone, solve the
problem.
B. The Bad: Rule 413
Nowhere is the conundrum of establishing a feminist position on
character more difficult or more interesting than in considering the
new evidence Rule 413 which admits evidence of the defendant's
prior rapes.96
(1) The Best Case for Rule 413
Supporters of Rule 413 argue that the probative value of the
prior rapes is high because the sexual aggressiveness and proclivities
of defendants are distinctive enough to warrant a propensity argu-
ment.97 Supporters also argue that the potential unfair prejudice is
94. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 2, at 1288
95. Williams, supra note 8, at Al.
96. Along with Rule 413 which deals with rape, Congress passed Rule 414 on child
molestation and Rule 415 which applies both to civil cases. See 137 Cong. Rec. S3191.
53238-39 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991).
97. See infra notes 112-137 and accompanying text (discussing theories of 413's rele-
vancy in detail). The notion of a rule informing the jury of the defendant's tendency to
assault women or children is not new. A few states still have a depraved sexual instinct or
lustful disposition rule, permitting evidence of the defendant's tendency to molest or rape.
Technically, Rule 413, as part of the Federal Rules, will only apply to rape on military
bases and Indian Reservations. Yet the influence of the Federal Rules is so pervasive that
its adoption is of vital importance. See Pickett, supra note 17, at 893 (discussing "lustful
disposition"); Anne Elsberry Kyl, Note, The Propriety of Propensity: The Effects and Op-
eration of New Federal Rides of Evidence 413 And 414, 37 ARIz. L. REV. 659 (1995) (dis-
cussing state adoption of Rule 413). The proposed rules do. however, effect a major
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exaggerated. David Karp,98 chief architect and defender of the new
rules, argues that the concern about unfair prejudice reflects the
"anti-jury" assumption "that the ordinary people who serve on juries
will behave unreasonably, if they are allowed to have this type of in-
formation and to accord it its natural probative value." 99
Rule 413 seems particularly appealing in consent cases. Rule 413
appears to address the phenomenon of sexual aggressors and abusers
who commit repeat offenses but nevertheless manage to discredit
each individual woman who accuses them of rape by arguing consent.
Professor Roger Park has argued that where identification and sexual
contact are admitted, but consent is in question, there is a strong pol-
icy argument in favor of admitting prior similar sexual attacks.'
00
Admitting evidence of the accused's prior rapes where the issue is
consent (a narrower proposition than the current rule) seems to ad-
dress the vexing problem of circularity in identification in stranger
rape cases.'0' For this reason I will confine my critique to consent
cases, where the strongest arguments can be made in favor of Rule
413.
On a simple and yet compelling level, Rule 413 seems good for
women's physical safety and psychological well-being.10 2 Discussing
change in the doctrine and tenor of character evidence. In a letter to Judge Ralph K. Win-
ter, Jr., Chair of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, a group of law professors
expressed concern over numerous ambiguities including questions concerning the discre-
tion of the trial judge and the interaction with other rules concerning hearsay, best evi-
dence and limitation on impeachment of witnesses. See David P. Leonard, Perspectives on
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415: The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Politi-
cal Process, 22 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 305, 335 (1995) (quoting and discussing the letter).
98. David Karp's recent address to the AAIS carried the weight, according to the
sponsors of Rule 413. See David J. Karp, Symposium on the Admission of Prior Offense
Evidence in Sexual Assault Cases: Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense
Cases and Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15 (1994). Karp was senior counsel for the
Office of Policy Development, United States Department of Justice. The ideas for new
rules originated in the Department of Justice and Karp was one of the original drafters.
99. Id. at 26-27 (quoting JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 62.2 (Tillers rev. ed. 1983)).
100. Roger Park, Perspectives on Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415: The
Crime Bill of 1994 and the Law of Character Evidence: Congress has Right about Consent
Defense Cases, 22 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 271,271-72 (1995).
101. No aspect of misidentification serves feminist interests: an innocent man wrongly
accused, a rapist still out on the loose, and social complacency following the apprehension
of "the perpetrator." Hence, many have argued that the newly proposed rules are par-
ticularly unfair and unwise in rape cases where identification is an issue. In the case of
stranger rape, where the search for the culprit begins with mug shots of known rapists,
there is a significant possibility of false accusation built into the system. See Baker, supra
note 36, at 592-97 (expressing concern over wrongful convictions and perpetuation of a
criminal class drawn disproportionately from minorities and the poor).
102. See Karen M. Fingar, And Justice for All: The Admissibility of Uncharged Sexual
Misconduct Evidence Under the Recent Amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence, S.
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the defendant's similar prior bad acts and his "character" for sexual
attack will increase conviction rates, thereby protecting women (as-
suming we've convicted the right person). ° Supporters emphasize
the necessity of the new rules, arguing that without such evidence,
victims are not believed and convictions cannot be won.1 4 Rule 413
addresses the maddening problem of repeat offenders who manage to
discredit each survivor individually.10 5 Arguably, such testimony will
sensitize our society about the prevalence of rape. In turn, the in-
creased numbers of rapes brought to trial and, ultimately, to convic-
tion, will assist in general deterrence by signaling our seriousness
about rape.
The new rules arguably empower women, allowing victims to
speak out in confidence, knowing that they will be supported in their
assertions and treated with respect by the jury. Representative Kyl in
support of Rule 413 argued that they would "go a long way toward
neutralizing the psychological damage a rape victim often experiences
going through the judicial process. '10 6  This focus on empowering
women is consonant with the drive behind "dominance" feminism,
which seeks to rectify power differences between men and women.
Some feminists see Rule 413 as respect for jurors' common sense
and a desire to enrich the context in which the jury makes decisions.
This argument taps into difference feminism, which posits that
Cal. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 501 (1996); Debra Sherman Tedeschi, Comment, Federal
Rule of Evidence 413: Redistributing "The Credibility Quotient," 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 107
(1995).
103. Part of the justification of Rule 413 rests on unbridled need. As Representative
Susan Molinari, the principal sponsor in the House of Representatives, explained: "The
enactment of this reform is first and foremost a triumph for the public-for the women
who will not be raped and the children who will not be molested because we have
strengthened the legal system's tools for bringing the perpetrators of these atrocious
crimes to justice." 140 CONG. REC. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Molinari).
104. As Senator Robert Dole explained of the new rules: "evidence of this type is fre-
quently of critical importance in establishing the guilt of a rapist or child molester, and
that concealing it from the jury often carries a grave risk that such a criminal will be
turned loose to claim other victims." 137 CONG. REC. S4925, S4927 (daily ed. Apr. 24.
1991) (statement of Sen. Dole).
105. The power of women testifying together is undeniable. In fact, the reason for
Alex Kelly's flight was that in 1987 the Judge had ruled both rape charges would be tried
together. Kelly's attorney told him he was sure to be convicted. George Judson, New In-
age Is Sought In a Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1996, at B5.
106. 140 CONG. REC. H5437-03, H5439 (daily ed. June29, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Kyl). Kyl also noted that even where the victim is "too traumatized, intimidated, or hu-
miliated to file a complaint and go through the full procedure of a criminal prosecution,"
such victims "are often willing to bear the burden of testifying when they find out that the
person who marred their lives has also victimized others and that these revelations will
come out at trial." Id.
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women have a "different voice," unique ways of knowing and relating
that differ from men's approaches.' ° To the extent that additional
background about the accused provides additional information and
context, that result seems consonant with the different voice. Adding
character information provides context to the arid, often skeletal facts
adduced at trial. Such character evidence can increase the jury's in-
formation about the parties and their ability to put the evidence
within a framework that makes the trial narrative more comprehensi-
ble. Whether from the perspective of "dominance" or "difference"
feminism, Rule 413 thus confronts the essential feminist concern that
women are not heard in the courtroom.
A final argument in favor of the new rules is quasi-procedural.
Courts, primarily through Rule 404(b), but in some states also
through "lustful disposition"' l 8 exceptions, are letting in evidence ofprior crimes anyway. 10 9 It is questionable, however, whether this ex-
107. Difference feminism is strongly influenced by the "ethic of care" articulated by
Nel Noddings and Carol Gilligan, in NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH
TO ETHICS & MORAL EDUCATION (1984); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE
(1982). The ethic of care relies on "webs of interconnectedness." See id. at ch. 2 (empha-
sizing the human relationship between people rather than formal hierarchies. In accor-
dance with women's focus on relationships, the female voice immerses itself in the par-
ticulars of problems, seeking context-based solutions. See id.
See Mari J. Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A
Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16 N.M. L. REv. 613, 620 (1986) (noting that
"[t]ime and again women have found that their own experiences are more valuable truth-
seeking tools than the abstractions of others."); see also Menkel-Meadow, Portia, supra
note *, at 48 ("Women solve problems by seeking to understand the context and relation-
ships involved and understand that universal rules may be impossible."). There is no claim
that this different voice is descriptive of all women, or necessarily superior.
This approach to difference is also open to serious criticism because it seems to
echo traditional excuses for sexism, for example, that women are too anecdotal, emo-
tional, or spiritual for active participation in public life. See Frances Olsen, The Sex of
Law, in THE POLrTCs OF LAW, 453, 458-59 (David Kairys ed., 1990); see also Anne M.
Couglin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 90-91 (1994) (arguing that the ethic of care
replicates negative qualities traditionally associated with women, thereby contributing to
women's oppression in society); Note, Patriarchy Is Such A Drag: The Strategic Possibili-
ties of a Postmodern Account of Gender, 10 HARV. L. REV. 1973, 1974 (1995). This "dif-
ferent voice" can also be seen as perpetuating male power by objectifying a male proto-
type and establishing it as the norm from which women are supposedly "different."
108. Lustful disposition exceptions, though they vary from state to state, generally
provide forthrightly the evidence of rape and sexual molestation as categorically different
from other prior bad acts, much in the same way that Rule 413 does.
109. Critics and fans of the new rules alike have observed that courts seem to be more
expansive in their application of Rule 404(b) in sex abuse cases than in other areas of
criminal law. Evidence of prior rapes and child molestations is sometimes inappropriately
labeled as other purposes (besides propensity) listed in 404(b), such as plan, intent, and
identity. See, e.g., Mendez & Imwinkelried, supra note 12, at 473 (criticizing the California
Supreme Court's expansion of its interpretation of "plan" to allow prior bad acts to be
admitted against a defendant in a child molestation case).
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pansion is as prevalent in rape cases as in child abuse. 110 The advo-
cates of the new rules argue that the stretching of current doctrine
proves the inadequacy of the character rules in dealing with the
unique principles of rape and child molestation. Rather than do vio-
lence to current character evidence, they propose a frank exception
for rape and child molestation."'
(2) A Feminist Critique of Rule 413
Despite its initial and obvious appeal, Rule 413 raises many con-
cerns. It is extraordinarily unpopular with evidence scholars,'1 but
my focus is different (though I agree with their critiques). I will dis-
cuss six serious feminist concerns, arguing that despite its initial ap-
peal, Rule 413 is dangerous and bad for women.
First, allowing character evidence of prior acts raises some diffi-
cult problems for feminists whose philosophy includes empathy for
the stigmatization of outsiders."' Certainly, women's experiences be-
110. Courts allowing a back-door admission of the prior crimes through 404(b) where
the argument, in truth is propensity, is bad for evidence law and the rule of law in general.
See id.
111. As then Senator Robert Dole explained: "[JI]f an exception admitting such evi-
dence cannot be avowed openly and honestly, then the temptation is strong to achieve
admission by manipulating other exception categories, and by applying evidentiary rules in
a manner that is not consistent with their interpretation and application in non-sex offense
cases. This state of affairs is undesirable because judges should not have to bend or break
the law to do the right thing." 137 CONG. REC. S4925, S4927 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1991)
(statement of Sen. Dole).
112. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 97, at 305 (arguing that although the political proc-
ess has always informed the rules, these new amendments are so politically motivated as to
have "radically changed the shape of the rules" and to have created an exception to the
principle that different types of cases and different types of litigants should be treated
similarly); see also James Joseph Duane, The New Federal Rules of Evidence on Prior Acts
of Accused Sex Offenders: A Poorly Drafted Version of a Very Bad Idea, 157 F.R.D. 95,
125 (1994); Pickett, supra note 17, at 883.
113. Although the feminism advocated here is concerned about what is good for
women, it aims to transcend the parochial or chauvinistic. It is deeply concerned with
compassion for others. Such empathy and compassion is a natural outgrowth of taking the
ethic of care seriously and of questioning the status quo with post-modern skepticism. See
Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Challenges and Cultural Change, 100
YALE L.J. 1731, 1735-36 (1991). If indeed women value webs of connection and express
an ethic that elevates concern for outsiders born out of women's experience as "other" or
outsider, a philosophy of feminism must include these concerns. See Susan Bandes. Em-
pathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361 (1996):
Henderson, supra note 36, at 56. As Professor Deborah Rhode has explained in her defi-
nition of feminism: "Any ethical framework adequate to challenge gender subordination
must similarly condemn the other patterns of injustice with which it intersects." See
Rhode, supra at 1736. Sometimes, particularly in the rape cases discussed in this article.
there will be a conflict between empathy for the accused (particularly when he comes from
an oppressed minority) and practical concern for what is good for women. Often, how-
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fore the enactment of Rape Shield laws serve as a warning of how
"character" evidence can be used as an oppressive tool. Support for
the idea of "character evidence" in one context may lead to applica-
tions in other contexts that injure women.
For a long time it has been apparent to feminists that more in-
formation does not equal more fairness. More irrelevant but poten-
tially prejudicial information can obscure the truth-finding mission.
Indeed, the whole notion of relying on "character" runs counter to
the historical experience of women. Women branded with bad or
"loose" character in rape cases must be leery of our culture's collec-
tive intuition. This is especially true because psychological evidence
suggests that the average person's intuitions about rape contradict the
empirical evidence.1 14 Such a blind devotion to "context" can lead to
disastrous results for women and for fairness.
Second, the rules rest on anti-feminist assumptions.1 5 In arguing
the relevance and persuasiveness of these prior acts, the advocates of
413 display attitudes and assumptions that betray basic anti-feminist
biases.
Rule 413 assumes that some facet of a rapist's character exists
that makes him not only a likely recidivist, but particularly aberra-
tional and dangerous. Prior rapes are probative because they are dis-
tinctive, because rape is so deviant, and because rapists are psycho-
paths so different from the rest of the men in our society. David
Karp, who argued for a "common sense ground" of propensity, ex-
plained that "[o]rdinary people do not commit outrages.' 6 Karp
emphasized the probative value of character evidence with respect to
an accused who committed similar acts, contending that "evidence
ever, I think this is a false dilemma. Once the problem is analyzed enlightened concern for
women's safety recognizes that women are not safer or better off in a world that treats
those accused of crimes - even the crime of rape - unfairly. See id.
114. One might perceive a bitter irony in feminists' championship of character evi-
dence. Because the feminism I advocate includes a sensitivity and concern for other dis-
empowered groups, see supra note 113, we must learn from the history of oppression of
women and apply that understanding, particularly because African Americans, Hispanics,
and the poor are disproportionately represented as rape defendants.
115. This argument stems from a talk I delivered at the AALS Evidence Conference
in October 1996. Independently, Professor Katharine Baker recently published a forceful
feminist critique of Rule 413 in which she argues that the new rule "cannot be justified in
light of what feminist theory teaches us about rape and sex, what social science teaches us
about who rapes and why they rape, and what history teaches us about who gets blamed."
See Baker, supra note 36, at 565. Although I disagree with parts of Professor Baker's ul-
timate resolution, I agree with her feminist analysis of Rule 413 which in many important
aspects parallels my own. Baker argues that "Rule 413 and its supporting rationale fail to
acknowledge, much less incorporate, most of what scholars have learned about rape in the
past twenty-five years." I& at 589. Baker also makes a significant contribution, as a femi-
nist, in highlighting the issue of racism in rape prosecutions.
116. Karp, supra note 98, at 20.
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showing that the defendant has committed sexual assaults on other
occasions places him in a small class of depraved criminals, and is
likely to be highly probative in relation to the pending charge.
1' 7
This central assumption about rapists-that they are a deviant, dis-
crete group of outsiders and psychopaths-unveils the anti-feminist
origins and dangers of these new rules.'
18
A feminist understanding of rape and the rapist differs signifi-
cantly from the assumptions of those who sponsored Rule 413.
Rather than seeing rape as an aberration and rapists as a small group
of sick individuals, feminists examine the factors in our society that
make us tolerant of rape." 9 Feminists would reject the notion that
only a small, discrete cadre of miscreants and the criminally insane
are responsible for rapes. Feminists believe, and there is abundant
empirical evidence for this belief,1 20 that many otherwise normal
seeming, socially acceptable men are potential rapists, and that rape
may be as much a crime of opportunity as a test of character. Rape,
and acquaintance rape in particular, is wide-spread, occurring
throughout all strata of society. Rapists are not marked by any obvi-
ous character traits or appearance, nor are they of a particular class or
race, but are often merely physical manifestations of a generalized
tolerance for violence against women. Indeed, the concern sur-
rounding date rape stems from the fact that the nice guy, whom one
would never suspect, turns coercive and violent.
Because, as a feminist, I resist the initial assumption that rape is a
rarity perpetrated by a discrete group of sick individuals, I must, as an
evidence scholar, question the logic of using prior similar acts to
prove rape occurred in a principal case, even in cases of consent.
Here, the traditional evidence critique of Rule 413121 can be informed
and enhanced by feminist insight. As a logical matter, a feminist
would argue that given the tolerance for rape and its widespread per-
petration throughout society, evidence that the accused has raped
someone before is not necessarily probative in determining whether a
rape occurred in the principal case. To use an overstated analogy, if
witnesses established that the perpetrator wore a baseball hat while
committing a crime, how probative would it be if the person accused
117. Id. at 24.
118. See Baker, supra note 36, at 576-78 (discussing Rule 413 singling out of rapists as
deviant and providing empirical evidence that "the class of rapists is neither small nor par-
ticularly likely to be depraved").
119. "Because rape is common, because rapists are often psychologically 'normal'...
the prevalence of rape is more positively correlated to social norms regarding the accep-
tance of sexual violence and traditional gender roles than it is to any particular sexual
need, the given rationale fails to justify Rule 413." Baker, supra note 36, at 589.
120. See id. at 576, 577.
121. See infra notes 123 and 124.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49
NO BAD MEN!
of the crime also wore a baseball hat sometimes? Not very. It might
have some minuscule probative value, but given the number of peo-
ple who wear hats, it wouldn't tell you much.122 Tragically, the magni-
tude and extent of rape in the population warrants a similar conclu-
sion. The fact that a man raped once before is not necessarily
probative given the number of men who rape.
On the other side of the evidentiary balance, however, informa-
tion concerning the prior rape is extraordinarily prejudicial and un-
fair. This prejudice derives from traditional sources, such as the ten-
dency of the jury to overvalue the evidence, the desire of the jury to
punish the accused for past crimes, and the willingness of the jury to
ignore the high threshold of reasonable doubt.1l 3 A feminist analysis
adds another crucial insight, citing a unique source of potential un-
fairness: the jury's willingness to be swayed by evidence of a prior
rape is heightened because of its own misconceptions about the
prevalence of rape. The prejudice plays on the notion inherent in the
new rules that only a few rotten deviants are terrorizing women. Psy-
chologically, the jurors may need to find "the rapist," which is to say
to locate one cadet in the small corps of deviant individuals who seem
to be causing women such misery.1lz
Once a jury is faced with a bona fide rapist - that is, one who
has been accused or convicted before - the temptation to demonize
that person and ignore the depth and breadth of the problem of rape
is overwhelming. How psychologically comforting for the jury that
the prosecution located the person who is deviant and repulsive, "the
one" who victimizes women. By relying on the anti-feminist assump-
tion that rapists are a small group of sick, dangerous men, Rule 413
prejudices the accused by offering up someone who has already been
branded as a member of that small anti-social set.l2 5
122. This is also true on an individual level given our lack of knowledge regarding
rapists' recidivism rates.
123. See infra notes 134-137 and accompanying text (discussing the potential unfair
prejudice of admitting prior related bad acts).
124. This of course taps into one form of denial, in which we as a society believe that
rapes are rare events and the product of a demented individual. By limiting the perpetra-
tors to those outside the cultural norm, the jury is spared the pain of confronting the epi-
demic proportions and widespread perpetration of rape. Women are spared the realiza-
tion of their own vulnerability to violent attack. Righteous men are spared facing the fact
that they may not be able to protect wives, sisters, daughter, or friends. "Normal" men
who occasionally coerce sex are spared facing their crimes.
125. Applying traditional evidence lingo, given the widespread nature of rape and our
subtle tolerance of it, the fact that an accused has raped before may not be particularly
probative. Concomitantly, jurors may overvalue the prior rapes. Their desire to eradicate
rape may cause jurors to focus on the prior accusations and may distract them from con-
sidering the facts of the case in front of them. Most troubling, the jury may be infected by
irrational emotions, blinded by their antipathy for someone branded as a rapist and by
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Third, Rule 413 may soon become yet another barrier to prose-
cuting rape cases. After a few years of Rule 413, how long will it be
before a prosecutor tells a woman that her case is no good-or at
least unwinnable-because there doesn't seem to be any other evi-
dence of prior rape by the defendant? 126 What starts as a boon to
women easily transfoms into a requirement or a litmus test. 127 Where
the prosecution can find no evidence of prior similar conduct on the
part of the accused, the woman may somehow become suspect.
It might be argued that to be believed in rape prosecutions under
Rule 413, a rape survivor needs someone to back her up. 28 Rule 413
provides an opportunity for this type of vouching, which may make an
individual woman seem more credible, but it operates at the cost of
reinforcing our suspicion of all women. Rule 413 harks back to the
old corroboration requirements in rape law, which mandated inde-
pendent corroboration of the woman's story as a requirement for
conviction. Certainly, there is a distinction in motivation and tone be-
tween the common law distrust of women and the modern approach
of 413, which rests on the presumption that juries will mistrust
women. 129 Both, however, are predicated on the same assumptions.
Both reinforce the suspicion of women, undermine women's credibil-
ity, and ultimately reinvigorate rape myths. The very appeal of the
proposal, that it shores up women's stories and adds credibility to the
their own psychological need to focus the problem of rape on a few select individuals.
126. See Baker, supra note 36, at 591 (expressing the concern that under Rule 413 ju-
rors may learn to expect other act evidence and fail to convict if "only" one rape is
proved).
127. For instance, Rape Trauma Syndrome, which was designed to explain the coun-
ter-intuitive behavior of rape victims occasionally replaces one set of expectations of the
"1proper" way for a rape survivor to react with another set of rigid expectations. See infra
notes 154-155 and accompanying text. Women who do not fit the syndrome can be im-
peached and disbelieved. See Torrey, supra note 49, at 1064-65; cf Myrna S. Raeder, The
Double-Edged Sword: Admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome By and Against Batter-
ers in Cases Implicating Domestic Violence, 67 COLO. L. REv. 789 (1996).
128. As Representative Kyl explained in discussing Rule 413: "In most rape cases, it is
the word of the defendant against the word of the victim. If the defendant has committed
similar acts in the past, the claims of the victim are more likely to be considered truthful if
there is substantiation of other assaults." 139 CONG. REC. H10349, H10368 (daily ed.
Mar. 13, 1991) (statement of Rep. Kyl).
129. The explanations of the old corroborating requirement ring sexist and stupid to
our more modern sensibilities. Commentators today don't generally argue that women
are confused about their sexuality and therefore need force as an excuse for indulging sex-
ual pleasure. See Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation of
the Consent Standard, 62 YALE L. J. 55 (1952) (cited in SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 39
n. 42 (1987)). "[S]ince stories of rape are frequently lies or fantasies, it is reasonable to
provide that such a story, in itself, should not be enough to convict a man of a crime.-
Note, Corroborating Charges of Rape, 67 COLUM L. Rev. 1137, 1138 (1967) (cited in
ESTRICH, REAL RAPe at 42, 43 n. 57.). Nevertheless, the overarching message is the
same. Without additional evidence, a woman's story is not enough to convict.
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numbers, is also the best evidence of its ineffectiveness. 130 Rule 413 is
an inelegant, wrongheaded, and not particularly valiant attempt to
even the scales of credibility by piling more women on to one side of
the scale. If enough women tell the same story, the logic goes, it must
be true. The unfortunate consequence of the Rule's policies and
premises is that rape myths are further entrenched, and belief in
women will be increasingly tied to corroboration by others. Further-
more, the goals of Rule 413 are accomplished at the expense not only
of a genuine understanding of the nature of rape, but also at the ex-
pense of individual criminal defendants.
Fourth, Rule 413 may open the door to another type of defen-
dant's character witness, well beyond the standard opinion testimony
generally allowed by the current rules.131 Once the prosecutor, in the
case-in-chief, introduces evidence of three prior women who claim
that the defendant attempted to attack them, the door will be opened
to all sorts of "character" witnesses who will testify that when they
went on dates with the defendant, he behaved like a perfect gentle-
man. This supportive testimony will reinforce another rape myth of
the jury-that somehow the rape survivor asked for it or behaved
provocatively, or possibly that she and her corroborators brought out
something unpleasant in the accused, but that he is capable of be-
having well, and thus could not be among that small group of psycho-
paths who commit all the rapes.
Fifth, feminists must be on the lookout for differences in the law
that may cross the line from acknowledging women's different voice
and experience to patronizing women by providing them increased
"protection." One hint that Rule 413 may be more paternalistic than
feminist is the fact that its wording is nearly identical to Rule 414,
which deals with children. Feminists would not necessarily presume,
as the Federal Rules seem to, that the rule should be the same for
women and children-what I call the "lifeboat syndrome" (women
and children first). Instead, a feminist analysis would inquire into the
special circumstances of crimes against children and the particular
needs of child witnesses. The melding of the two categories of victims
suggests an infantilization of women.12
130. See Baker, supra note 36, at 591 (arguing that Rule 413 may secure additional
convictions, but only by playing into the rape myth that nice boys don't rape).
131. I am grateful to my colleague Lynne Henderson for pointing this out.
132. The conflation of the interests of women rape victims and child victims of moles-
tation also suggests a bit of doctrinal slight of hand. On many occasions, the argument in
favor of the probative value of prior similar crimes is stronger in cases of child molesta-
tion, where there is believed to be a higher recidivism rate for perpetrators. See Michele
L. Earl-Hubbard, The Child Sex Offender Laws: The Punishment, Liberty, Deprivation,
and Unintended Results Associated with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s, 90 Nw. U. L.
REV. 788, 795 (1996) (citing results from a National Institute study finding that each child
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Finally, the source of the proposed changes in the rules may be
of some concern for women. Rule-making makes strange bedfellows,
and some feminists have in the past found themselves in coalition
with the far right on issues such as pornography and hate speech. Be-
cause so much of feminism focuses on process and relationships, the
issue of allies and cohorts is a legitimate concern. At the very least,
feminists must acknowledge that the chief proponents of these de-
praved sexual instinct rules seem motivated by a desire to convict
criminals at all costs. In attitude and action they are not motivated by
feminist concerns.
These objections do not disappear if the prior rape convictions
are admitted via Rule 404(b) and the doctrine of chances. Katharine
Baker, after rejecting Rule 413, advocates admitting some prior acts
under a theory of 404(b) motive to explain motivation and social con-
text.133 One motivational category cited by Baker, the need to rape,
would ostensibly admit prior rapes if rape is a special means of violent
expression for the accused. For instance, the category would include
angry men who rape to alleviate their frustration. Although Baker's
solution avoids some of the anti-feminist assumptions of Rule 413, it
still replicates many of its evils in demonizing defendants and in mag-
nifying unfair prejudice. 134
molester abuses an average of 117 children); Robert A. Prentky et al., Recidivism Rates
Among Child Molesters and Rapists: A Methodological Analysis, 21 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
635 (1997) (finding that recidivism rates among rapists and child molesters are higher than
generally estimated). In addition, to quote the language of an older case, the "criminal
impulse which makes such an act possible is unnatural and unusual. The felony itself sug-
gests a carnal pervert." Abbott v. State, 204 N.W. 74, 75 (Neb. 1925) (cited in Julius Stone,
Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence, 51 HARv. L. Rev. 988, 1031 n.204 (1938)). Interest-
ingly, the argument in favor of the new rules is often supported most strongly by the expe-
rience of children-with whom consent defense is legally impossible. See, e.g., 139 CONG.
REC. S15137-04, S15138, S3240 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1993) (statement of Sen. Dole) ("The
importance of admitting this evidence is still even greater in child molestation cases.").
Doctrinally, however, the defenses are distinct. In adult rape cases the most difficult issue
is consent. There is no consent defense to child molestation.
133. Baker sets out different motives for rape including sexual desire, power and an-
ger, and cementing relationships among men. See Baker, supra note 36. at 612-23. Baker
argues that for rapes committed within the context of a group that uses sex as a means of
bonding with other men (such as a gang) evidence of how such sexual activity serves that
purpose should be admissible to show motive. See id. It is unclear to me, however, how
this will implicate prior rapes by the defendant and not merely provide background about
the defendant's motives and associations. Baker also argues that evidence of a rapist's an-
ger towards a particular victim should be admissible under the motive exception. See id.
Although this type of background motive evidence strikes me as unassailable, it does not
get at the heart of what 413 is about.
134. Additionally, Baker advocates absence of mistake as another ground for 404(b)
admissions. I think this presents the best 404(b) argument concerning prior rapes, but it is
quite limited. A prior rape could come in the absence of mistake prong of 404(b) to show
the implausibility of defendant's belief that the woman consented. To the extent that a
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Similarly, I don't think that the doctrine of chances argument can
allow admission of prior rape. Theoretically, the doctrine of chances
argues from probability. A jury, aware of five prior charges of rape
all defended with consent, might rightfully surmise that there was no
consent in the sixth, charged episode. According to the supporters of
413, the doctrine of chances argument runs: How likely is it that a
man accused of rape before was falsely accused this time as well? 35 It
is possible for a man to be accused falsely once, but three accusations
indicate that there is some pattern and that it is the man, not the
woman who is lying.136 However, I believe that a more accurate de-
scription of the genuine question being posed by the doctrine of
chances argument would run: How likely is it that three unrelated
women would all choose to lie about one innocent man? When so
many women get behind the same argument, it seems impossible that
they are all lying. 13
7
Furthermore, even if the elegant distinctions that some scholars
try to uphold are valid, and the doctrine of chances is merely an ap-
peal to jurors' notions of probability and coincidence. How many
times can there be smoke without fire? It seems that whatever evils
flow from a propensity argument do not apply equally to the doctrine
of chances approach.
defendant argues that he mistook the survivor's behavior for consent, this argument might
work (i.e., the last rape charge should put him on notice that what he thinks of as consent
is not). This "absence of mistake" approach can only apply, however, where the argument
is that the accused was legitimately mistaken (I did not realize she said no) and not where
the accused argues actual consent (she said yes). Any contrary result goes to the heart of
propensity, basically saying that the defendant has a tendency to have sex without consent.
Another important use of 404(b) is for modus operandi. Where the prior rapes identify a
particular and unique method of rape, there is a strong argument for admissibility. See
Baker, supra note 37, at 612-13.
135. David Karp supported Rule 413 with a doctrine of chances rationale. He con-
tended that evidence of other assaults by the defendant is highly probative in light of the
law of probabilities. "It would be quite a coincidence if a person who just happened to be
a chronic rapist was falsely or mistakenly implicated in a later crime of the same type."
Karp, supra note 98, at 20-21.
136. Professor Susan Estrich discussed the "credibility quotient: one woman might lie,
but four? One might have a motive to fabricate, but all of them? And if four women are
saying the same thing about one man, then maybe it's the man who's lying." See Susan
Estrich, Palm Beach Stories, 11 LAw & PHIL. 5,13 (1992).
137. As the Senate Report explained more neutrally: "the improbability of multiple
false charges normally gives similar crimes evidence of high degree of probative value."
137 CONG. REC. S3192, S3241 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991). Even without a feminist interpre-
tation, the doctrine of chances is problematic because it is hard to distinguish from a pro-
pensity argument. I am persuaded by Myrna Raeder and others who believe that it is
merely a dressed up version of an inadmissible propensity argument that innocent people
tend to act differently from guilty ones. See Raeder, supra note 127, at 1491 n.152 (dis-
cussing the work of Professor Paul Rothstein).
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(3) Some Second Thoughts Raised & Resolved
These feminist objections to 413 are real and heartfelt, yet I will
confess to being conflicted. There are certainly individual cases-
William Kennedy Smith's is emblematic-where one can surmise that
failure to admit evidence of other rapes has influenced the jury's deci-
sion to acquit. 138 Furthermore, I agree with the notion that women
may find support and power from others who have been raped by the
same defendant. Those who testify may feel that they are contribut-
ing to the safety of all women, thereby erasing some of the feelings of
powerlessness that they felt as rape victims.
I also worry about the educational message for the jurors who
acquit and then feel sandbagged. The jurors may feel guilty for hav-
ing reached the wrong verdict (though in stranger rape cases, it is not
obvious that they have), angry at having been denied what they per-
ceive to be vital information, and embarrassed at appearing to have
reached a ridiculous result. Thus, the system failed the jurors person-
ally and appears to have failed systematically in its pursuit of "truth."
As to a more general educational message, the public, which
usually knows facts not admitted into evidence, is also apt to be dis-
appointed and confused by acquittal. Often, these unadmitted facts
are precisely the kind considered here: character evidence of prior
similar acts. Given the public's interest in these trials and the me-
dia's dedication to uncovering, reporting and debating new informa-
tion regardless of admissibility, it is inevitable that a wider gap is de-
veloping between the "truth" as perceived by juries and the "truth" as
perceived by the public at large. " °0 The public (including women who
138. William Kennedy Smith, nephew of JFK, was arrested and charged with forcible
rape in 1991. Three other women came forward and claimed they had also been sexually
assaulted by Smith in the 1980's. The trial judge excluded this evidence as improper char-
acter evidence, unfairly prejudicial and outside 404(b) because insufficient proof of simi-
larity existed between the alleged offense and the prior accusations. Smith was acquitted.
See Margaret C. Livnah, Branding the Sexual Predator: Constitutional Ramifications of
Federal Rules of Evidence 413 Through 415, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 169, 173 (1996).
139. For instance, we all heard about the three other women who had written affida-
vits that William Kennedy Smith had made sudden, violent sexual overtures to them. We
all know that the affidavits were excluded from the jury and that the women were not al-
lowed to testify. Similarly, the fact that Alex Kelly was charged with a second, similar
rape allegation close in time to the first was not known to the jury (which hung despite
medical evidence of forced intercourse).
140. See, e.g., William Glaberson, For Juries, the Truth vs. the Whole Truth, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1996, at 5 (complaining of the exclusion of evidence of second alleged
rape in the Alex Kelly trial). Alternatively, to the extent that the public does not under-
stand the limitations on the jury's information, the jury may be deemed doltish and the
public may believe that anyone with a fancy-pants lawyer can persuade a jury of inno-
cence, no matter how guilty the accused. Ropert Frost once said: "A jury consistsw of 12
persons chosen to decide who has the better lawyer." Statement by Robert Frost. quoted
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have been raped) may despair, believing simply that it is hard to con-
vict on rape.
The problem stems not from exclusion of prior rapes, but from
lack of legal sophistication. The jury assumes that the absence of any
discussion of prior bad acts means there are none. Most jurors be-
lieve that they would hear about prior rapes if such prior rapes had
happened; thus, they possess an unspoken and perhaps not fully con-
scious belief that no such prior bad act occurred. 141 Although cer-
tainly inferior to encouraging legal literacy, Rule 413 would address
this misconception.
Finally, in its own back-handed way, Rule 413 does subvert some
rape myths, undermining, to a certain extent, the nice boys don't rape
myth. Any convictions of an atypical seeming rapist can serve the
cause of debunking myths. For instance, after Alex Kelly's convic-
tion, the Geraldo Rivera Show ran a segment: Funny, He Doesn't
Look Like A Rapist, in which he asserted, "The Alex Kelly verdict is
in and women across America are rethinking their definition of who
is capable of rape."'42
I take heart from the fact that, on retrial, Kelly, despite his reli-
ance on rape myths, was convicted without mention of his prior
rapes.143 In this small way Rule 413 may educate the jury, but only by
redirecting the jury's attention to an equally pernicious myth. It la-
bels the accused as one of those deviant recidivists (who just hap-
pened not to look the part).
Therefore, at most, Rule 413 is a symptomatic cure for a systemic
infection in our judicial system and our society at large. Its apparent
benefit for women's safety and validation of women's experiences is,
in fact, only apparent. Ultimately, Rule 413 is not particularly effec-
tive even as a palliative, masking rather than addressing underlying
symptoms, while visiting devastating side effects on criminal defen-
dants.
in KENNETH R. REDDEN & ENID L. VERON, MODERN LEGAL GLOSSARY 571 (1980).
141. In many respects, this is similar to jury confusion with the exclusionary rule. Ju-
rors are often confused because a relevant item (such as the stolen items or the drugs) is
not introduced into evidence. They presume that the failure to do so indicates that the
relevant items were never found. Consequently, the narrative makes no sense, there are
suspicious holes in the story, and the police seem inept or worse.
142. Geraldo Rivera Show, supra note 38. Geraldo Rivera asked the audience, "Do
you think you could spot a rapist? I think you'll think again after you hear the stories of
women raped by clean-cut, upstanding, good-looking guys."
143. Interestingly, the case cited by Senator Dole, Getz v. Delaware, 582 A.2d 935
(Del. 1990), as exemplifying the need for new rules admitting prior sex crimes resulted
similarly. See Livnah, supra note 138, at 171. Though the original conviction was over-
turned for introducing prior acts of child molestation, the accused (Kelly) was convicted
on retrial without that evidence. See id.
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C. The Ugly: Patriarchal Stories
Having identified the harm caused by the cultural rape paradigm,
it is reasonable to question whether it can serve any positive purpose
in rape cases. Professor Mary I. Coombs observes: "In an attempt to
persuade the fact finder that this particular situation should be ac-
knowledged as a sexual violation, the story is likely to be crafted,
within the limits of the facts, to resonate rather than to clash with the
fact finder's cultural script."'144 Professor Taslitz forwards the strate-
gic solution of fitting the particular case into existing rape themes.
For example, in prosecuting Mike Tyson, the government successfully
tapped into rape myths. The victim, Desiree Washington, fit the
paradigm by playing the role of the young innocent Sunday school
teacher who agreed to meet Tyson because her father admired him.
This virginal, "blameless" image, and the fact that she promptly re-
ported, helped convict Tyson. While Taslitz explicitly rejects any re-
liance on racist portrayals of perpetrators, he reluctantly supports re-
liance on rape myths surrounding the victim 145 as a transitional device
aimed at getting juries to credit women. Taslitz acknowledges that
using these themes serves to reinforce them; he nevertheless believes
that the prosecutor at this cultural moment has to engage such cul-
tural stories to paint a picture that will seem plausible to the jury. He
argues that because jurors are not likely to deviate from these themes,
it is not wise for the prosecution to attempt to reject them whole-
sale.146 This approach has, at least, the benefit of securing convic-
tions, making the world slightly safer, and convictions more common.
It is obvious that Taslitz is aware of the dangers of relying on the
patriarchal stories he so aptly chronicles, and that he struggles with
the prospect. Ultimately, however, I believe that he reaches the
wrong conclusion. True, there may be a conviction, but rape myths
are certainly reinforced. The jury and the public at large are satisfied
that rape did occur because, to pursue the example of the Tyson case,
a sweet, young, "innocent" Sunday school teacher was attacked.
Even as a transitional device, the reinforcement of rape myths is
pernicious on many levels. It distracts the jury, convincing them to
convict upon sexist stereotypes. The perpetrator is punished for who
he is perceived to be (sex-craved, deviant, violent, etc.) and who his
victim is perceived to be (blameless, virginal, cautious, et cetera)
144. Coombs, supra note 7, at 278.
145. Coombs argues: "The process of crafting a story that is as consistent as possible
with current understandings of what qualifies as a true story of sexual violation leaves
those understandings unchallenged. Worse, it reinforces these cultural scripts by instanti-
ating them in the current case." Id. at 278-79.
146. See Taslitz, supra note 51, at 493-94.
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rather than for what each did. More practically, the ramifications for
the safety of women are enormous.
For people to care about rape and address it, they have to see it
fully for what it is, including forced sex perpetrated by a "nice young
man" on a date gone sour; a crime that can be committed against a
prostitute or one's own wife; a crime that is not lessened because the
woman was out late or provocatively dressed. The reinforcement of
rape myths by affirmative use of patriarchal stories may win a battle,
but it contributes to losing the war against rape.
This is not merely an academic concern or a desire for theoretical
purity; it is absolutely clear that rape myths endanger women, not just
humiliate them after the fact. On a societal level, rape myths allow us
to deny and thereby ignore sexual violence against all but the few
women who fit the paradigm's profile. Moreover, psychologists tell
us that acceptance of rape myths is an excellent predictor of who will
commit rape.'47 A man who believes the myth that women really de-
sire to be raped, that only virgins can be raped, or that one is owed
sex (forced if necessary) after providing a nice dinner, is more likely
to commit such sexual attacks. 148 In addition, the woman who be-
lieves these myths is more likely to ignore the suspicious signals sent
by a "nice young man" and less likely to report a rape that deviates
from the paradigm, both because she may doubt herself and because
she feels that no one would believe her. Such reinforcement of rape
myths would also affect prosecutors' willingness to charge149 and, of
course, juries' willingness to convict when the case deviates from the
paradigm. Therefore, shoring up rape myths and appealing to patri-
archal stories will perpetuate not only our tolerance but also the inci-
dence of rape.
D. The Hopeful: Expert Evidence on Dynamics and Demographics
of Rape
Because evidence law is so intertwined with culture, it is tempt-
ing to say that rape myths will inevitably influence fact-finding in rape
cases until society itself changes its ideas about rape. I believe, how-
ever, that a paradigm shift is possible, if we take the educational func-
147. Men who self-reported that they would rape if they could be assured of not get-
ting caught scored disproportionately high in accepting rape myths. See infra notes 196
and accompanying text.
148. Many clinical reports support the finding that rapists believe in rape myths and
tend to have callous perceptions of their victim's reaction to being raped. See Check &
Malamuth, supra note 60, at 346 (citations omitted).
149. The issue of whether defense attorneys should be allowed to rely on trial tactics
that reinforce rape myths raises fascinating questions about legal ethics outside the scope
of this article.
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tion of a trial seriously, and realize that a trial can shape public opin-
ion as well as reflect it.
°50
Experts who debunk myths about rape survivors can play a vital
role in educating judges and juries about women's experiences. 15
Currently, the most common way this is done is through expert testi-
mony concerning rape trauma syndrome (RTS). 152 RTS is a form of
post-traumatic stress disorder that describes various physical, behav-
ioral, and psychological reactions that can result from rape. 53 In ad-
dition to other things, an expert, relying on RTS, can explain why
many women, because of shame, trauma, or shock, do not report a
rape right away. 54 This educational task is particularly important and
difficult because, as noted in Section III, jury members may find the
expert's message counterintuitive or psychologically uncomfort-
able. 155
The debate about expert testimony in rape tends to center
around the nature and scientific quality of RTS and its proposed
150. Also, Professor Mary Coombs discussed interesting non-litigation opportunities
for challenging the paradigm such as teaching, legal scholarship and personal conversa-
tion. See Coombs, supra note 7, at Section III (Expanding the Cultural Repertoire of Sto-
ries).
151. See generally Toni M. Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The
Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony. 69
MINN. L. REV. 395, 447-52 (1985); David McCord, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony
Regarding Rape Trauma Syndrome in Rape Prosecutions, 26 B.C. L. REV. 1143 (1985).
152. See generally McCord, supra note 151, at 1144.
153. See Vidmar & Schuller, supra note 84, at 135, 155. RTS charts two phases of reac-
tion to rape: (1) an acute phase marked by disorganization where the victim may be hys-
terical or may be withdrawn and subdued; and (2) a long-term re-organizational phase
characterized by nightmares, phobias, and sexual fears. The diagnosis of Rape Trauma
Syndrome was originally designed as a psychological tool to help treat survivors of rape
and other sexual violence, and developed as an outgrowth of Post-Traumatic Stress Syn-
drome. See 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
§§ 9-1 to 9-6 (2d ed. 1993). See Massaro, supra note 151, at 424-26, David McCord. Syn-
dromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to the Admissibility of Non-
traditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L. REV. 19, 38-41 (1987).
154. See Bridget A. Clarke, Making the Woman's Experience Relevant to Rape: The
Admissibility of Rape Trauma Syndrome in California, 39 UCLA L. REV. 251, 274-78
(1991) (noting that expert testimony concerning RTS is relevant to dispel myths and mis-
conceptions about rape, including the notion that a woman who has been raped should
appear outwardly upset, report immediately, and demonstrate physical injury).
155. See Karla Fischer, Defining Boundries of Admissible Expert Psychological Testi-
mony on Rape Trauma Syndrome, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 728 n.296 (citing anecdotal
evidence that jurors are ignorant about the effects of rape including reports that they ac-
quitted because the alleged rape victim showed too little emotion while testifying).
156. Commentators debate whether syndrome evidence is scientific or specialized
knowledge under Rule 702. If classified as science, it must meet the standards set out in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (arguing that expert scien-
tific testimony must be based on valid scientific knowledge). See David L. Faigman. The
Evidentiary Status of Social Science under Daubert: Is It "Scientific, " " Technical," or
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use. Courts are most likely to admit evidence by RTS experts where
the evidence comes in as rebuttal to assertions by the accused that the
woman did not act the way a "real" survivor of rape would.157 Be-
cause the questions are initially raised by the accused, courts see no
unfairness in allowing experts to rebut these overt challenges to the
victim's credibility.
Courts are particularly concerned that the expert does not use
RTS to vouch for the credibility of a victim witness (i.e., the victim
demonstrates RTS so she must be telling the truth; this victim isn't
faking).158 Additionally, courts are leery of admitting RTS to prove
that the rape was actually committed. 59 For instance, courts typically
"Other" Knowledge, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y AND L. 960 (1995) (arguing that psychology
should be subject to the structure of Daubert and should not be classified as technical or
other specialized knowledge); Teresa S. Renaker, Comment, Evidentiary Legerdemain:
Deciding When Daubert Should Apply to Social Science Evidence, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1657,
1686-87 (1996) (arguing for a functional approach in which scientific conclusions based on
psychology are subject to Daubert but applying a "helpfulness" standard where experts do
not draw explicit conclusions about the facts of the case). See generally Edward J. Im-
winkelried, The Next Step After Daubert: Developing a Similarly Epistemological Ap-
proach to Ensuring the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 15 CARDozo L.
REV. 2271, 2272-74 (1994); Jennifer Sparks, Comment, Admissibility of Expert Psycho-
logical Evidence in the Federal Courts, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1315, 1315 (1995). This debate is
beyond the scope of this article. Because much of the evidence I advocate is based on sci-
entifically reliable empirical studies and demographics it would pass the Daubert test.
157. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 431 N.W.2d 165, 172-73 (Wis. 1988) (holding "where
a defendant has suggested to the jury that some conduct of the victim after the incident is
inconsistent with her claim of having been sexually assaulted, the use of expert testimony
in relating observations of the way other sexual assault victims actually behave serves a
particularly useful role by disabusing the jury of some widely held misconceptions about
sexual assault victims."). See also Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 496 (Ind. 1995) (find-
ing that "behavioral characteristics of child abuse victims, even where inadmissible to
prove abuse, are far less controversial when offered to rebut a claim by the defense that a
child complainant's behavior-such as delayed reporting or retracting allegations-is in-
consistent with her claim of abuse").
158. See Renaker, supra note 156, at 1670-71; Fischer, supra note 155, at 725 ("Almost
all courts prohibit expert testimony that states the victim was raped, or is not lying, on twin
rationales that this testimony invades the jury's province or that it directly bears on the
witness' credibility."); see, e.g., Hutton v. Maryland, 663 A.2d 1289, 1297 (Md. 1995) (pro-
viding extensive support for the position that where "PTSD expert testimony also ad-
dresses the credibility of the victim, it has been held inadmissible because it invaded the
province of the jury."); cf. Plata v. Texas, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 2722, at *7 (Tx. Ct. App.
July 3, 1996) ("It is improper for an expert to offer an opinion on whether the child com-
plainant is telling the truth.... Testimony is also prohibited on whether a class of persons
is generally truthful).
159. See State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 219, 222-23 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (contrasting
psychological testimony used to "rehabilitate the credibility of the alleged victim when
that credibility may be called into question because of behavior by the alleged victim that
could seem inconsistent with having been sexually assaulted," with testimony used "to
support the direct inference that the alleged victim was sexually assaulted"); cf. State v.
MacRae, 677 A.2d 698, 701 (N.H. 1996) (holding that "the State may offer expert testi-
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reject expert testimony which asserts that evidence of RTS proves
that the woman did not consent (the theory being that her post-
traumatic stress symptoms demonstrate the fact she was raped).1 6° A
more complicated question arises concerning the extent that the ex-
pert describing RTS may opine about the relationship between victim
and syndrome.1 61 Many courts prohibit an expert from testifying that
the victim "fits" the syndrome or that her behavior is consistent with
sexual abuse.
162
Courts' use of expert testimony in rape trials is too narrow in two
mony explaining the behavioral characteristics commonly found in child abuse victims to
preempt or rebut any inferences that a child victim witness is lying [but not] to prove that
a particular child has been sexually abused") (citations omitted). But see People v.
Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 398 n.17 (Mich. 1990) (noting that some courts admit rape
trauma evidence to show lack of consent and citing cases).
160. Courts reason that there are many explanations of trauma and although certainly
relevant to a conclusion that a rape occurred, expert testimony would be unfairly prejudi-
cial both because it is scientifically unsupportable and because of the status of the expert
to whom the jury may be likely to defer for the "answer" to a tough question (and ulti-
mate issue) of what happened. Cf Lisa R. Askowitz and Michael H. Graham, The Reli-
ability of Expert Psychological Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 2027, 2098 (1994) ("[T]here are a variety of stressors in a child's life
that can produce PTSD-type symptoms, and there is no baseline data about the presence
of PTSD-type symptoms in nonabused and otherwise nonstressed children."). But see
Louis A. Trosch, Jr., State v. Strickland: Evening the Odds in Rape Trials! North Carolina
Allows Expert Testimony on Post Traumatic Stress Disorder to Disprove Victim Consent,
69 N.C. L. REV. 1624, 1641 (1991) (arguing that RTS should be admissible to prove non-
consent); Clarke, supra note 154, at 252, 293.
161. For a slightly dated but thorough discussion of the case law, see Fischer, supra
note 155, at 724-26.
162. See id. at 720-22 (citing cases where the experts testified that the victim fit the
syndrome). The distinction between expert testimony that the victim was raped and ex-
pert testimony that the victim fits the syndrome involves some very fine line-drawing. See,
e.g., United States v. Whitted, 11 F.3d 782, 786 (8th Cir. 1993) (reversing admission of a
physician's diagnosis that the alleged child victim had been sexually abused, but allowing
physician to summarize the medical evidence and express his opinion that the findings
were consistent with sexual abuse). I agree with the New Hampshire Supreme Court, in
State v. Cressey, 628 A.2d 696, 699-700 (N.H. 1993), that there was "no appreciable differ-
ence" between a statement that "the children exhibited symptoms consistent with those of
sexually abused children ... and a statement that, in her opinion, the children were sexu-
ally abused." (emphasis omitted). But see Renaker, supra note 156, at 1677. See Steward
v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 495-99 (Ind. 1995) (discussing the disagreement among state
courts as to whether experts may describe "certain behavioral characteristics as being con-
sistent with sexual abuse, thereby offering direct proof through implication, rather than
where the expert explicitly draws the conclusion for the jury" and concluding "we decline
to distinguish between expert testimony which offers an unreserved conclusion that the
child in question has been abused and that which merely uses syndrome evidence to imply
the occurrence of abuse."). Cf Thomas D. Lyon & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Relevance
Ratio: Evaluating the Probative Vahe of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 43, 50-54 (1996) (criticizing as misleading physician's testimony that
child's behavior is consistent with abuse).
[Vol. 49
closely related respects. First, the use of RTS is too restrictive and
unimaginative. Second, the scope of expert testimony about rape
should routinely transcend RTS information about victims' reactions.
It should also include information about rape myths and stereotypes.
Experts should provide demographic, psychological, and sociological
background information about rape, including the frequency of rape
and the wide range of victims and perpetrators.
(1) Using RTS More Creatively and Expansively
Although significant differences exist, courts tend to engage in
dualistic thinking. Often, courts analyze RTS as either proof of the
ultimate fact of rape in the particular case or as educational evidence
to rebut the accused's assertion that the victim's behavior indicates
that she is lying. 163 There is an alternate use that many courts have
tended to ignore. Courts should admit expert testimony on RTS for
educational purposes even where the accused has not questioned the
victim's behavior in order to discredit her and even where the victim's
behavior is not outrageous or bizarre.' 64 As discussed in Section III,
rape myths permeate our culture. There is every reason to believe
that even without prompting by the accused, jurors will question:
Why did she delay reporting? Why did she agree to go back to his
apartment? Even where the accused makes no open appeal to rape
myths, these myths, though unspoken, are compelling and pervasive,
prompting the jury to be suspicious of women who have reported
rape. r 5 Therefore, the prosecution should be allowed to introduce
expert evidence where there is no overt resort to rape myths by the
163. See, e.g., People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291, 299-302 (Cal. 1984). In Bledsoe, the
California Supreme Court held that RTS is inadmissible when offered to prove that the
complaining witness was in fact raped. ldL The court, however, reasoned that such testi-
mony would be admissible to rehabilitate the complaining witness when her credibility was
impeached by a defendant suggesting that her conduct after the incident, such as delay in
reporting, was inconsistent with her testimony about being raped. Id. at 298. The Court
reasoned that "in such a context expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome would play a
particularly useful role by disabusing the jury of some widely held misconceptions about
rape and rape victims, so that it may evaluate the evidence free of the constraints of
popular myths."
164. See Fischer, supra note 155, at 713-17.
165. See United States v. Hammond, 17 MJ. 218 (1984) (approving in punishment
phase evidence of effect of rape trauma from expert witness who never met the victim and
noting that "one of the great obstacles to proper adjudication of rape prosecutions is the
jury members' (or court-martial members') relative lack of education as to the psychologi-
cal aspects of the crime of rape and that expert testimony may be properly used to provide
that education.") (citing John L. Ross, The Overlooked Expert in Rape Prosecutions, 14
UNIV. oF TOL. L. REv. 707 (1983); see supra notes 62-84 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining rape myths and their effects on jurors).
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defense.166
Whenever an expert testifies, she must provide information to
assist the jury.' 67 To justify admission of this expert testimony, we
must overcome the false belief that most people know something
about the typical behavior of rape victims. 68 Such education is espe-
cially important for judges who initially rule on the admissibility of
expert testimony and may be swayed by popular notions of how rape
victims behave. r69 Admissibility of such educational background evi-
dence would not operate on a theory of propensity (e.g., the com-
plaining witness seemed in a state of shock and did not report imme-
diately, therefore she suffered RTS, and therefore was probably
raped). Rather, this use of RTS would educate the fact-finder that
there are many different potential reactions to the trauma of rape,
some of them in direct opposition to popularly held beliefs and
stereotypes.
170
(2) Adding Background Evidence About the Nature of Rape and Rapists
The scope of expert testimony should be expanded beyond psy-
chological evidence of RTS to include other essential background
166. This occasionally does happen. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Perkins, No. 95-1353-CR.
1996 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1015, at **1, 15-16 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 1996) (affirming convic-
tion where expert testified in prosecution's case-in-chief that complaining witnesses' de-
meanor was consistent with the initial reactions of adult sexual abuse victims); cf Plata v.
Texas, No. 04-95-00690-CR, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 2722, at *1 (Tx. Ct. App. July 3, 1996)
(affirming conviction in case where "an expert witness testified in prosecution's case-in-
chief that it is common for an abused woman to recant her complaints of abuse").
167. See Fed. R. Evid. 702.
168. See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 378 (N.J. 1984) (finding that social research
about battered women examined "an area where the purported common knowledge of the
jury may be very much mistaken, an area where jurors' logic, drawn from their own expe-
rience, may lead to a wholly incorrect conclusion, [and] an area where expert knowledge
would enable the jurors to disregard their prior conclusions as being common myths rather
than common knowledge").
169. See Vidmar & Schuller, supra note 84, at 135 n.17 ("Judges might equally benefit
from the expert evidence if they are ignorant of certain social science findings about hu-
man behavior."); Robert P. Mosteller, Is the Jury Competent? Legal Doctrines Governing
the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Concerning Social Framework Evidence, 52 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 85 n.3 (1989) ("It should not necessarily be assumed, however, that
judges are immune to the effects of myths and misconceptions, particularly in the highly
charged areas of rape and child sexual abuse."); Massaro, supra note 151, at 468 (arguing
that myths and fears concerning rape may influence judicial decisions not to admit expert
evidence concerning the rape trauma syndrome).
170. In a study of average citizens' understanding of rape based upon a fourteen-
question quiz, "the scores showed that, in general, most people knew very little about the
facts regarding rape. The average score of the respondents on the fourteen-item test was
less than four items correct." H. FIELD & L. BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE: A STUDY IN
PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 89 (1980).
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demographic and sociological information about rape. One way to
conceive of this type of expert evidence on rape would be to consider
it as a unique form of group character evidence. 1
7 1
This type of background evidence would subvert common rape
myths, and address issues above and beyond RTS. 72 For instance,
experts could state information about the nature of rape, such as the
fact that most victims are raped by people they know, or that victims
are less likely to report a rape when they are acquainted with the per-
petrator.173 An expert could discuss the demographics of rape survi-
vors, such as the fact that women of all ages and socio-economic
backgrounds are victims. Providing statistics about the wide-spread
nature of rape should not encourage the jury to engage in probabilis-
tic reasoning that it is somehow likely that the accused committed the
rape.' 74 Rather, such statistics undermine the notion that all rapes
conform to our restrictive cultural paradigm. Like the expansion of
RTS evidence, this background evidence on rape is not limited to the
rebuttal of specific rape myths, but instead anticipates the sway of
those myths and addresses them in the prosecutor's case-in-chief.
Finally, and most controversially, experts could undermine rape
myths about rapists. For instance, expert testimony providing back-
ground evidence could debunk the myth that nice (read: rich, edu-
cated, white) boys don't commit rape. The expert would not present
a "profile" (and certainly should not attempt to provide a match-up
from the profile to the rapist), but would refute the often unspoken,
but firmly held notion that only desperate, poor, sex-starved, anti-
social deviants commit rape.175 For example, in McAlpin, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court permitted a police officer to testify that there is
no profile of a "typical" child molester.176 Rather, such an individual
can be of any social or financial status, any race, any age, any occupa-
tion, any geographical origin, and any religious belief or no religious17
belief at all.' The officer testified that such offenders can also be
persons of good or even impeccable reputations in the community.
178
171. See Mosteller, supra note 169, at 86, 104-05 (analogizing the concept of social
framework background evidence to character evidence).
172. By "background evidence" I refer to statistically verifiable social science demo-
graphics and observations by competent professionals based on clinical experience.
173. See e.g., People v. Hampton, 746 P. 2d 947, 952 (Colo. 1987).
174. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice Through Psychologi-
cal Character Evidence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1, 28 (1993) ("One other form of the corrective or
educational use of psychological character evidence involves the comparison of an indi-
vidual to 'normal,' not for probabilistic predictive reasons, but to help the jury understand
how normal people react in certain situations.").
175. See People v. McAlpin, 812 P.2d 563,570-71 (Cal. 1991).
176. See id.
177. See id. at 568, 571.
178. See id.
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The officer testified in the prosecution's case-in chief, but also accu-
rately anticipated the accused's defense that the accused was re-
spected in his community. 179
Another example stems from Key v. State,80 where the Texas Court
of Appeals affirmed the admissibility of testimony from a rape crisis
counselor, Sue James, in the prosecutor's case-in-chief. The coun-
selor testified about how rapists choose their victims, explaining that
it was not uncommon for a rapist to establish a brief relationship with
the victim, such as being seen in public with the victim before raping
her so that she would not suspect any potential danger and so that her
credibility would be diminished.18 ' The Court of Appeals concluded
that "the expert's testimony here assisted the jury in resolving a con-
tested issue. As established by James, the average person does not
understand how a rapist chooses his victim and might not understand
the victim's passive conduct."' 8 2 Although it recognized the potential
prejudice, the court held that the probative value outweighed any un-
fair prejudice. 183 The court explained:
James drew no conclusions as to the truthfulness of the vic-
tim or the believability of her story. She only provided a
context within which the jury might understand certain be-
havior. The testimony complained of did not directly con-
cern this victim, this defendant or this sexual assault. Rather,
the witness testified as to particular classifications and be-
havior patterns.
18 4
The use of expert testimony to educate the jury is not a new con-
cept. This notion of providing background information is similar to
Professors Walker and Monahan's proposal to use social science and
empirical evidence to create social frameworks.' 86 These social
179. See id. at 570-71.
180. 765 S.W.2d 848, 850 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
181. See id. at 849.
182. Id. at 850.
183. See id. at 851.
184. Id.
185. As part of the debate among scholars about the extent to which the judicial sys-
lem should defer to experts and the extent to which experts should be used to educate the
fact-finder (mostly surrounding the Rule 703 question of whether courts or experts them-
selves should determine the reasonableness of reliance on inadmissible evidence), many
have extolled the educational value of experts. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S.
Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference or Education?, 87 Nw. U. L. REV.
1131 (1993).
186. See Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social
Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 559 (1987). Walker and Monahan discuss expert tes-
timony on eye-witness identification and syndrome evidence. See id. at 563-66. They cite
State v. Myers in which the Minnesota Supreme Court approved admission of expert tes-
timony concerning behavioral trait typical of abused children, noting that "[b]ackground
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frameworks allow jurors to "construct a frame of reference or back-
ground context for deciding factual issues crucial to the resolution of
a specific case."187 Although my vision is broader than the limits im-
posed by Walker and Monahan, my goal is similar: to construct a
framework within which the jury can build an understanding of rape.
Others have also noted the need for such background informa-
tion and have suggested expert testimony as a means of providing it.
Professor Morrison Torrey proposes "de-programming" jurors,
judges, and others involved in the criminal justice system through the
use of expert testimony.1 88 Similarly, Myrna Raeder advocates educa-
tion of the jury about domestic violence in murder cases where a pat-
tern of domestic violence ends in the death of the woman.189 Profes-
sor Raeder argues "that jurors need background evidence about the
dynamics of domestic violence in order to make rational decisions
about the significance of the evidence presented at trial."'19 Professor
Raeder distinguishes this background evidence from Battered
Woman Syndrome, arguing that we must transcend the reliance on
data providing a relevant insight into the puzzling aspects of the child's conduct and de-
meanor which the jury could not otherwise bring to its evaluation of her credibility is help-
ful and appropriate." Id. at 567 (quoting State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 610 (Minn.
1984)).
187. 1d at 559. Walker and Monahan recommend using jury instructions to educate
about social framework. They analogize between social science results to precedent and
make a good case for having the judge instruct the jury on certain background information
verified by social science in much the same way that she instructs the jury on the law. See
id. at 585-88. Walker and Monahan anticipate that parties would submit brief on social
framework evidence. They note that the judge must play an activist role evaluating the
social science and searching it out on her own, measuring the fit and seeing how other
courts have used it. See id. at 588-91. Although the notion of enhanced jury instructions is
intriguing, it is objectionable for at least four reasons. First, it departs from our current
method of imparting non-legal information to the jury, and would require significant sci-
entific knowledge and activism on the part of the judge. Second, jury instructions, which
come at the end of the trial, are often boring and confusing and the social science could get
lost in the myriad of definitions and explanations. Third, the important functions of help-
ing the narrative make sense, dispelling rape myths, and allowing the jury to hear the story
without having it overshadowed by the cultural paradigm are undermined considerably if
the jury has to wait till the end of the trial to get oriented about the nature of rape. It may
be too late for jurors to really hear the testimony which they apprehended via the screen-
ing mechanism of rape myths. Finally, acceptance of rape myths is not limited solely to
juries. Judges need the education too; who will instruct them? See Mosteller, supra note
169, at 109-12 (critiquing the judicial instruction solution).
188. Professor Torrey suggests that courts allow expert testimony not only on rape
trauma syndrome but also concerning the falsity of rape myths. See Torrey, supra note 49,
at 1064-65.
189. See Raeder, supra note 127, at 790-95.
190. Id. at 790. A jury's acquaintance with information about battered women and the
dynamic with the batterer will counteract certain misconceptions about domestic abuse,
such as the belief that if the woman stayed the abuse could not have happened or must
have been very mild.
Mar. 1998] NO BAD MEN!
syndromes, which often have a way of backfiring on women.19' In-
stead, Professor Reader advocates a broad, educational approach that
uses experts to explain the sexual and cultural dynamics of violent
relationships between the sexes. 192 Debunking rape myths benefits
not only the individual trial, but also society at large. As noted above,
belief in rape myths correlates with the willingness to rape and the
tolerance of rape. 193 By educating the jury and educating society at
large, we protect women.
(3) Practical Issues Raised by Expanding Expert Testimony on Character
How would this background evidence be put into practice? Ob-
viously the rules of relevancy and the Rule 702 helpfulness standard
limit the type of evidence that can be introduced. To provide useful
and pertinent testimony, the expert must describe the phenomenon of
rape myths and refute any rape myths and misconceptions that are
relevant to the case. The party (mostly, as I explain below, the prose-
cution) that wishes to admit evidence of rape myths bears the burden
of demonstrating that the rape myth actually exits and that it is rele-
vant to the particular case. An expert can rely on the myriad psy-
chological studies that define, catalog, and measure the potency of
various rape myths. Ideally, common law will develop around the
definition of rape myths and their admissibility. Appellate courts
could develop standards, and after a while, trial court judges could
take judicial notice of the existence and falsity of certain rape myths.
Obviously, there must be a "fit" between the myth and the facts of
the case. If, for instance, the rape survivor is twenty years old, there
is no relevance to debunking the rape myth that only younger women
are attacked.
Although I expect the nature of the testimony to develop over
time, it is worthwhile to briefly sketch the type of expert testimony I
advocate. For this purpose I will again rely on the facts of the Alex
Kelly case. 194 Under my proposal, an expert (either a social worker,
rape crisis therapist, psychologist or psychiatrist) would first explain
191. See id. at 796 (discussing how feminists have attacked BWS as a doctrine). See
also Susan Stefan, The Protection Racket, 88 Nw U. L. REV. 1271 (1994); Melanie Frager
Griffith, Note, Battered Woman Syndrome: A Tool for Batterers?, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
141 (1995) (discussing how accused batterers attempt to use BWS to show they did not
rape).
192. See Raeder, supra note 127, at 805-07. Raeder observes that "[s]ocial science evi-
dence acts as the glue binding the prosecution's case together, providing the background
that the jurors lack about the societal and psychological context in which the contested
facts occurred so they can understand and evaluate claims about the ultimate fact." Id. at
792.
193. See supra notes 148-153 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 8.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49
what rape myths are. Next, the expert would relate demographics
about rape, including its frequency and the fact that it is wildly under-
reported. For these facts, the judge could probably take judicial no-
tice, particularly because many of these statistics emanate from gov-
ernment reports. Next, the expert would explain the nature and
effect of rape myths, relying both on the psychological literature and
the expert's clinical experience. Finally, the expert would explain the
falsity of those rape myths that are relevant to the facts of the case.
In the rape trial of Alex Kelly, those myths might include: (1) that ac-
quaintance rape is rare; (2) that women who are truly raped report
immediately; (3) that women commonly lie about rape to hide sexual
indiscretions from their families; (4) that a woman who accepts a ride
in a young man's car is "asking for it"; (5) that only desperate men
who have no other outlets for their sexual needs commit rape; and (6)
that all rapists appear dangerous and deviant.
The expert would articulate these myths and systematically re-
fute them with empirical evidence and clinical observations. In addi-
tion, the expert would explain the psychological pull of the cultural
paradigm. Only the relevant rape myths would be triggered. For the
Alex Kelly case, there would be no need to refer to the rape myth
that all rapes result in demonstrable physical injuries because the sur-
vivor did in fact have such injuries.
The background evidence I advocate raises at least four addi-
tional concerns. First, does it work? The groundbreaking work of
Jody Armour who writes about confronting stereotypes about Afri-
can Americans is very instructive and inspiring. 95 Armour has delved
into the psychological and neurological evidence of how stereotypes
are formed and how they can be defeated. He distinguishes between
prejudice, which he defines as a conscious derogatory personal be-
lief 96 and stereotypes, which he defines as "well-learned internal as-
sociations about social groups that are governed by automatic cogni-
tive processes.' ' 9 7 Although it may be impossible to overcome firmly
ingrained conscious discriminatory beliefs, it is possible, according to
Armour, to develop techniques to help jurors combat unconscious
discriminatory tendencies that have been learned as stereotypes at an
early age. 98 By explicitly challenging jurors to confront their biases
against blacks and to consciously monitor their habitual responses to
195. See Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decision Makers
Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REv. 733 (1995).
196. See id. at 741.
197. Id. at 733, 741. Stereotypes such as rape myths have some basis in experience but
are typically over-broad caricatures of reality. They inhibit careful individual judgment
and encourage generalized, sweeping assumptions.
198. Armour cites psychological evidence that proactive strategies that draw attention
to unconscious tendencies can be very successful.
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the stereotyped litigant, 199 Armour holds out "a narrative of hope.' '2°°
The good news is that by talking about stereotypes and making jurors
aware of inherent biases, it is possible to mitigate the harmful effect
of stereotypes. This awareness, this self-consciousness, address
problems of deep-rooted bias that are otherwise averse to legal solu-
tions.
Similarly, psychological data indicates that an expert's strong
refutation of rape myths and discussion of the horror of rape can ef-
fectively counteract the effects of these myths. Subjects usually ex-
posed to sexually violent depictions of rape, which tend to enhance
rape myths, showed a lower acceptance of rape myths even weeks af-
ter exposure where they also received strong statements about the
trauma of rape and the inaccuracy of rape myths.20 ' Expert testimony
on the potential problems with eyewitness accounts has been similarly
found to improve juror decision-making.2 2 The expert does not tell
the jury who or what to believe, rather the expert fills in gaps based
on scientific knowledge and clinical experience that allows the jury to
fashion a coherent story. It is true that the "ultimate culprit may be
cultural stereotypes." But that does not mean law is bereft of any
role. The opposition of "bad laws" versus "bad attitudes" develops
an either or philosophy that need not be so stark 203 and reveals the
lack of integration between law and social values. 2°4 The key to the
dilemma of cultural bias is to think creatively about what trials can do
to shape, or at least to shake up, the views of fact finders and all those
who follow trials.
Second, we must examine whether such expert testimony raises
problems of unfair prejudice and confusion. Will an expert "Herr
Doctor Professor" overawe the jury, cause jurors to stop thinking in-
199. See id. at 770.
200. Id. at 762.
201. See Torrey, supra note 49, at 1067-69 (discussing a study performed by Canadian
researchers Neil Malamuth and James Check).
202. See Mosteller, supra note 169, at 89 n.17; see generally Steven D. Penrod & Brian
L. Cutler, Eyewitness Expert Testimony and Jury Decisionmaking, 52 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 43 (1989); Michael R. Leippe, The Case for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness
Memory, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y AND L. 909, 909 (1995) ("Trial simulations that test the
reliability of eyewitness expert testimony indicate that it promotes modest, appropriate
increases in skepticism about eyewitnesses, even when the expert gives a general overview
of research and admits to limitations. The psychological and legal professions should de-
velop responsible guidelines for use of expert testimony in court.").
203. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 2, at 1228. They conclude that "the evidence,
although mixed, suggests that rape reporting rates are generally unresponsive to changes
in a particular jurisdiction's rape law. Even when those changed signal a desire to reduce
victim blaming in rape trials." Id.
204. See id. at 1224.
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dependently, and merely defer to the expert's conclusions? 2 5 Such
concern, though typical in evidence scholarship, is not necessarily
borne out by psychological studies. Psychological experiments with
eyewitness testimony (a good analog because it is another matter ju-
rors might believe they know about, but don't)20 6 indicate that while
expert testimony has an effect on jury deliberation, it is not determi-
native. Empirical studies demonstrate that fact-finders tend to give
expert testimony on eyewitness identification less weight than logic
would dictate, so there is little danger of the jury overvaluing this
background information. °7 Furthermore, one would expect juries to
be even more suspicious of expert testimony on rape where the mes-
sage is not only counterintuitive but also psychologically uncomfort-
able. °8 Additionally, although far from a panacea, limiting instruc-
tions provide an additional buffer against a jury's overvaluing expert
testimony.2°9 A related and more realistic fear is that the jury may be
confused or distracted by a battle of the experts.
Third, how does such background evidence about rapes, when
conceived as a form of character evidence, fit within the rules?
Walker and Monahan believed that their social framework evidence
would only be admissible to the same extent that all other character
evidence is admissible: such as in criminal cases and only if raised by
the defense or brought by the prosecution to rebut same. 2 1 Although
I am persuaded that this type of background evidence has many theo-
retical connections with the concept of "character" writ large, I agree
with Professor Mosteller that the rules of admission need not be so
205. See People v. Bothuel, 252 Cal. Rptr. 596, 599 (1988) (expressing concern that
juries may overvalue or misunderstand expert testimony - "even if reference to the spe-
cific victim is avoided") (citation omitted).
206. See Walker & Monahan, supra note 186, at 578 (noting that information about
eyewitness deficits is often not common knowledge).
207. See id. at 576-77. "The introduction of a social framework thus creates little risk
of inciting turmoil and appears unlikely to be accorded 'excessive' probative value." Id. at
577.
208. See Massaro, supra note 151, at 444-45; McCord, supra note 151, at 1205 (reject-
ing the notion that juries will slavishly follow expert testimony).
209. See Bothuel, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 601 (where the California Court of Appeals be-
lieved the expert went too far, but the court nevertheless refused to reverse because of the
defense's lack of objection and because the trial court clearly admonished the jury of its
limited use). "[T]he jury must be admonished 'that the expert's testimony is not intended
and should not be used to determine whether the victim's molestation claim is
true .... The evidence is admissible solely for the purpose of showing that the victim's re-
actions as demonstrated by the evidence are not inconsistent with having been molested."'
Id at 599-600 (quoting People v. Bowker, 203 Cal. App. 3d 385, 394 (1988)) (emphasis
omitted).
210. See Walker & Monahan, supra note 186, at 581-82. Clearly Walker and Monahan
wrote before Rule 413 was adopted or even seriously entertained.
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restrictive. 211 The purpose of such evidence is not to argue for pro-
pensity, but rather to undermine our culture's limited understanding
of rape, including sexist and class-based notions about victims and
racist and class-based notions about attackers. Furthermore, given
Rule 413's drastic departure from the ban on character evidence, ad-
vocacy of expansive background testimony seems tame by compari-
son.
This leaves one final, vital issue: the use of such background evi-
dence by the defense. Both RTS and Battered Woman Syndrome
have demonstrated the possibility of a potential catch-22. These
forms of evidence merely replaced one set of rigid expectations about
the "proper" way for a rape survivor or battered woman to react with
another set of rigid expectations. Women can suffer when they don't
fit patriarchal presumptions, or if they do fit those presumptions, then
they are suspected of making it all up because they don't fit the syn-
drome "requirements.,212
Although this problem is real, the danger is less likely to arise
with the type of background evidence I advocate. This expert testi-
mony is relevant and helpful because it refutes rape myths. The ap-
propriate message of such background evidence is that rape is a com-
plex phenomenon; there are many potential responses to the trauma,
and many faces of the rapist. Rather than conceive of any one
authoritative model, expert background testimony should debunk the
cultural paradigm as the exclusive rape narrative. Because the mes-
sage is the heterogeneity of victims and perpetrators and the variety
of rapes and motives for rape, it is hard to imagine how the defense
would be able to subvert this evidence by relying on rape myths of a
lying woman or any other myths for that matter. For this reason, a
defense attorney in a stranger rape case cannot solicit expert testi-
mony that stranger rape is a myth and most rapes are by people
known to the survivor. Such testimony is not relevant to debunking
an established myth. Hence it is not helpful and potentially confusing
to the jury. The one area in which I could imagine defense testimony
about rape myths concerns African American men, who are some-
times stereotyped as sexual predators, out to stalk and violate white
women. To the extent that the jury may become aware of such myths
211. See Mosteller, supra note 169, at 109-12.
212. See supra notes 148-153.
213. To the extent that the defendant in a rape trial relies on the argument that he is a
nice person who would never commit such a heinous act, he should be allowed to do so
even though it may trigger the rape myth that nice boys do not rape. The constitutional
underpinnings of a right to present favorable character evidence, no matter how suspect,
support this result. See FED. R. EVID. 404 comments; see generally Taslitz, supra note 174.
Obviously, to the extent the accused raises such character evidence, the prosecution may
rebut same.
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about African American men, I believe it is consonant with the over-
all fairness of trials and desirable from a feminist perspective to allow
the defense to debunk this myth using expert testimony.
Conclusion
Rape trials often fail women. I have presented a feminist version
of the truth of rape trials, attempting to diagnose and heal the jury's
tin ear in hearing and believing women. How, then, can jurors who
may feel threatened or pained by the stories of rape overcome these
feelings and truly listen to the woman victim, rather than blame or
dismiss her? Perhaps it is impossible for a jury to transcend the cul-
tural image of the unbelievable, conniving woman who ensnares and
then falsely accuses. But if a jury could envision a different, feminist
truth, one which we can justify as being more righteous, more descrip-
tive, and more empathetic, we must search for methods to aid the jury
in overcoming its proclivity for rape myths.
In reviewing recent changes in character evidence as well as con-
sidering potential innovations, I evaluated various methods of using
character evidence in communicating such a feminist vision to the
jury. I have tried to present defensible criteria for measuring the suc-
cess and fairness of various types of character evidence in rape trials,
thus allowing women to be heard in a new way by jurors, without
fundamentally altering the rights of the defendants or the fairness of
the process. To that end, I distinguished between evidence and court-
room practices that enhance and enrich the survivor's narrative from
those that impoverish and infect it with unfair prejudice by appealing
to stereotyped or misogynist thinking. I reject character evidence
that appeals to juries based on rape myths or misconceptions about
rape.
With mixed feelings I reject Rule 413. Such use of character evi-
dence strikes me as unacceptable not only from evidence theory and
doctrine (a point made by many), but also from a feminist perspec-
tive. Rule 413 holds out the enticing prospect of increased convic-
tions. It also may subvert some rape myths-by obtaining more con-
victions, by convicting those who may depart from our cultural image
of rapists by providing increased information and offering a forum for
victims to speak out. Nevertheless, Rule 413's expansion of character
evidence to include the prior similar crimes of the accused will actu-
ally distort the narrative with sexist assumptions, and ultimately per-
petuate rape myths about perpetrators and victims.
I also reject evidentiary techniques that use character evidence of
the survivor or accused to "match" the rape paradigm. For instance, I
believe it is ultimately a mistake for the prosecutor to portray the vic-
tim as virginal or to highlight her modest dress. Such resort to the
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rape paradigm may indeed assist in the conviction of the case at bar,
but at tremendous cost to women and society at large because it con-
tributes to the overall mistrust of women. Belief in rape myths cor-
relates with willingness to rape and tolerance of rape. By educating
the jury and perforce educating society at large, we protect women. If
we are to take the educational function of a trial seriously, we cannot
tolerate resort to fables that reinforce stereotypes and demonize the
accused.
Ultimately, the best, albeit slow, mechanism for educating both
the jury and society at large is the use of experts as teachers. Experts
offering background information about the frequency and dynamics
of rape present the best compromise on how to use character evi-
dence to promote feminist principles while preserving defendants'
rights.
